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3. Gaps in workers’ skills on multiple levels
Among the contributors to low competitiveness, shortages of human capital 
and skills stood out on multiple levels, even for parts of the BPo sector focusing 
on “low-skill” work. Mostly lacking were technical skills, but also limited soft 
skills were problematic. Higher education institutions appeared unable to fill 
skill gaps comprehensively and prepare a BPo work force. BPo providers often 
trained their employees themselves; however, this increased their cost. 
4. Late-follower challenges
In both countries, the sectors went through a learning curve concerning the 
potentials and limitations of BPo work. the main learning outcome was that 
internet connectivity does not eliminate the need for direct, trusted interactions 
with clients and an understanding of their needs. Both continue to be easier 
to achieve in markets close to the BPo operator’s own location or when 
temporary physical proximity (torre, 2008) can be established (e.g. during 
shorter visits of international clients). It appeared no longer possible for Kenya 
or Rwanda to achieve the overwhelming scale efficiencies and trust advantages 
of Indian and other Asian operators. Notably, Rwandan interviewees expressed 
a firmer belief in the elimination of geographical distance due to internet-
mediated connectivities. this might mean that internet connectivity is an initial 
hurdle that prevents managers from seeing other hurdles until it has been 
transcended. 
Findings for connectivity-based enterprises
1. the importance of skills, learning and combinations of local and global 
knowledge 
Value chains and networks of all connectivity-based enterprises relied heavily 
on learning and skill formation, in particular for technical knowledge such as 
in software development. Internet connectivity, through enabling access to 
open source software communities and resources, had a meaningful impact 
on enhancing the skills of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s work forces. Yet, hands-on 
mentoring, talent with complementary non-technical skills and exposure to 
new contexts and networking opportunities usually generated the greatest 
successes. International exposure in particular enabled actors to leverage the 
‘best of two worlds’: local knowledge and superior skills. this meant that a 
small but growing segment of local connectivity-based enterprises, offering 
services to domestic and African markets, has been able to derive a palpable 
net benefit from improved connectivity. over time, the value derived from 
internet connectivity and the value derived from ICt-related skills appear to 
have mutually enhanced each other.
2. social connectivity and trust as necessary conditions for ICts to bridge 
distances
ICts could not replace or make superfluous the need to establish trusted social 
relations with clients and business partners to enable economic interactions. 
this was true even though value chains of connectivity-based enterprises were 
predicated on ICts’ distance-bridging potential. Connectivity-based enterprises 
engaged in value creation and extraction that served (end) customers at a 
distance (without face-to-face interaction), but any larger and more sustained 
economic transaction required the establishment of social connectivity and 
trust. temporary geographical proximity between actors (for instance, during 
conferences or short in-country visits by international actors) was one initiator 
of ongoing transnational business relationships, but relationships were rarely 
“born online”. Lacking conceptual connectivity—a collective and a priori trust 
between East African companies and foreigners—was often an important initial 
burden before any company would even be able to prove itself as trustworthy in 
a one-on-one relationship. the only exceptions were internationally operating 
companies where trust was established via alternative pathways (such as the 
company’s brand and reputation or broader contractual arrangements). 
3. domestic and regional markets as newly found opportunities
Companies in all three sectors were largely focused on businesses generated 
within Africa. In Kenya, businesses were mainly focused on Uganda, tanzania, 
and south sudan. Rwandan-based companies were focused on similar 
countries, but also on the democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. 
Increasingly, domestic and regionally proximate markets have revealed 
unexpected potentials, and have been developed into modest but sustainable 
and growing value creation and extraction opportunities. 
4. Gateways and gatekeeping
Connectivity-based enterprises followed diverse pathways of transitions and 
upgrades, usually based on iterative increases in social connectivities and 
trust. By and large, the most prevalent expansion paths proceeded from local 
to regional to global, and rarely was a ‘born-global’ strategy realistic. small 
Rwanda- or Kenya-based businesses often began with one formal contract 
with a foreign client that helped them to establish themselves. Foreign 
large companies typically entered the Rwandan or Kenyan market through 
tenders for large projects. ICt innovators would start with website design 
or international and practical exposure and sometimes flourish from there. 
Government and large institutional actors occasionally acted (unintentionally) 
as gatekeepers towards smaller firms through rigorous tendering 
requirements. 
Recommendations 
our findings led us to derive a set of recommendations for government 
agencies, policy, industry associations and development organizations that aim 
to foster sectors of BPo and connectivity-based enterprises. 
1 Building skills on multiple levels
Connectivity-based enterprises in Kenya and Rwanda face a large gap between 
their skill demand and the available supply. Beyond technical expertise, 
management and soft skills are lacking and hamper businesses’ productivity 
and competitiveness. Higher education needs to provide graduates with more 
comprehensive and applicable skill sets. Public private partnerships between 
universities, training institutions, enterprises and government could help 
students, freelancers and junior employees improve their job and income 
opportunities. 
2 Identifying a competitive edge  
 for the local sector
when attempting to support a globally active local sector that is already well 
established in other countries, policy should carefully weigh what competitive 
advantage the local sector will have over foreign competitors. Labour cost 
advantages might not be sufficient and might not outweigh scale efficiencies 
and learning advantages that foreign competitors have already established. 
Competitiveness might rather be derived from unique knowledge of, and 
access to, local and regional markets. A lack of local knowledge can also be a 
barrier for international companies coming into these markets. Government 
incentives, such as funds and subsidies, can be an option, but they need 
to be based on a realistic and in-depth assessment of local businesses’ 
competitiveness and opportunities for value creation and extraction.
3 Adopting a holistic perspective across sectors
when establishing a connectivity-based enterprise sector such as BPo, policy 
needs to pay particular attention to other sectors that have related value chains 
and rely on similar input factors. Beyond internet connectivity, skills, reputation, 
regulation, the availability of mobile and electronic payments, access to risk 
finance and several other factors matter as enablers for connectivity-based 
enterprise sectors. Vicious and virtuous circles within and across related value 
chains have to be considered.
4 Considering social connectivity beyond internet connectivity
there is an important difference between accessibility and being accessed 
through the internet. Connectivity-based enterprises, like any other business, 
rely on the awareness and the trust of their customers, suppliers, and partners 
to be able to make contracts and deals. these social factors are usually best 
ExEcutivE summary
Background and study setup
Internet connectivity is widely considered to be a game changer for knowledge 
economies of developing countries. the arrival of submarine fibre-optic 
underwater cables in East Africa in 2009 and 2010 is seen by many as a 
strong case in point. the fast evolution of the information and communication 
technology (ICt) landscape of Kenya and Rwanda that ensued has attracted 
the attention of actors from private investors, development agencies, NGos, 
policymakers and many other groups. Kenya became a role model for its wide-
spread adoption of mobile money services and a burgeoning ICt application 
development sector; Rwanda’s government became known for its explicitly 
ICt-oriented development agenda as well as large-scale ICt projects in 
government, health and education that aimed to latch onto fast-growing mobile 
subscription rates and 3G network roll-outs.
For this report, we set out to examine the role that changing connectivity has 
played for a particular component of the ICt sector in Kenya and Rwanda: 
ICt-enabled business process outsourcing (BPo).1 BPo has been a priority in 
the national ICt strategies of both countries, so we anticipated this sector to 
provide a fertile ground for comparing expectations and realities of the role that 
changing connectivity has played following the deployment of fibre-optic cable 
infrastructure.
BPo is also an interesting sector because internet connectivity is at the heart of 
its value chain: At first glance, fast internet connections should go a long way in 
bridging geographical distance and enabling Kenyan and Rwandan businesses 
to tap into continuously growing BPo demand from all over the world. BPo 
is also inherently a global, or at least a widely geographically distributed, 
industry. our analysis was therefore designed to shed light on the risks and 
opportunities of establishing connectivity-based local sectors that are bound to 
be exposed to international markets and competition.
we used an analytical framework that honed in on the effects of increased 
internet connectivity on the value chains of the BPo sector. since we 
wanted to examine potential benefits and risks of changing connectivity 
for local BPo businesses in Kenya and Rwanda—that is, businesses that 
create and extract economic value through and for individuals regularly 
located in Kenya and Rwanda—we further examined the interaction of value 
chains with geography and the locations of different actors on those chains. 
we wanted to identify both the geographically contingent exchanges that 
happen along the BPo value chain and the exchanges that happen locally 
across the value chains of related sectors.
our team of researchers from the oxford Internet Institute developed a 
staged, in-depth analytical approach to elicit the expected and actual roles 
that changing connectivity played in the Kenyan and Rwandan BPo sectors. 
we first conducted a content analysis of 378 East African media sources 
to understand the hopes and visions invested in the arrival of fibre-optic 
cables. once we started conducting interviews, we quickly found that mainly 
the Rwandan but also the Kenyan BPo sectors were less active than we 
had envisioned. we then included other kinds of ICt-based companies in 
our sample in order to understand the environment of the core BPo sector 
and potential barriers that had kept it from growing further. Broadening 
the scope also made sense as policymakers in both countries had come 
to recognize that the promotion of international BPo was likely to require 
more fundamental changes in the structure of their domestic economies. 
we ultimately conducted 102 interviews with policymakers and private 
sector representatives in both countries. two open focus groups in 2013, 
in Nairobi and Kigali, were used to corroborate preliminary findings, and 
to disentangle inconclusive ones. A final workshop held in August 2014 
in Kigali served to collect a last round of feedback from Rwandan BPo 
practitioners.
Findings
Relevant sectors and value chains
1. An active BPo sector was found to exist in Kenya but not in Rwanda. Even 
Kenya’s, over a decade-old, BPo sector has not been able to capture large 
amounts of work from foreign clients, falling far short of original hopes and 
expectations.
2. two additional sectors within local ICt industries have distinct value chains 
while also playing a role in shaping the BPo sector: ICt innovators (such as 
start-ups developing new applications and software) and ICt connectivity 
enhancers (such as electronic payment intermediaries).
3. the three sectors together (BPo, ICt innovators and ICt connectivity 
enhancers) can be summarized as connectivity-based enterprises: these 
businesses provided content and services through value chains and 
networks that depended on ICt infrastructure (hardware and software) put 
in place by local and international ICt corporations or government entities 
(such as subsidized/government-owned and private mobile network 
operators, device manufacturers, and software multinationals). 
we first outline findings that apply specifically to the BPo sector, before 
outlining findings that hold more broadly across all three connectivity-based 
enterprise sectors.
BPO-specific findings
1. diverse but persistent (re-)intermediation
the limited outsourcing opportunities that were available from international 
clients were usually subject to various forms of mediation: such as, through 
online platforms, through international consultants, through governmental 
or government-affiliated agencies or through impact sourcing agencies. our 
observations also supported the idea of ‘re-intermediation’. distributed work 
platforms like odesk and elance, by virtue of their design principles, offer only 
certain kinds of barely-profitable and non-sustainable work in a ‘take it or 
leave it’ format. Better connectivity also allows international consultants and 
more powerful companies to re-package and re-distribute work to Kenyan and 
Rwandan companies that are lower down in the chain. Kenyan and Rwandan 
BPo actors believe that this intermediation lowers their margins and that a 
greater degree of disintermediation would benefit the sector.
2. Understanding the market forces of global BPo value chains and networks
As late follower countries for BPo, Kenya and Rwanda have faced strong 
competitive pressure from mature BPo industries in India and south East 
Asia. the local BPo sectors do not have the depth, scale efficiencies, cost-
competitiveness and skill base to compete for international customers with 
established foreign BPo companies and markets. due to a lack of international 
competitiveness, Rwandan and Kenyan-born BPo enterprises have largely 
expanded within their home countries or across Africa (for some Kenyan 
companies), where they can offer a better fit of supply and demand (defined 
by provided/demanded quality and price). At times, local BPo companies 
themselves “re-outsource” their work abroad, hiring foreign companies, as 
this can still be cheaper than doing it locally for large scale and complicated 
projects. In addition, subsectors of BPo do not always adhere to the same 
market dynamics, for instance, regarding available deal flow and required skills. 
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1. introduction
How does a Us-American customer of a dutch insurance company find 
herself speaking to a Rwandan call centre operator in Butare? How did the 
information she conveys with her voice end up being packaged as data, routed 
through myriad wires and switches in dozens of countries, ultimately traveling 
thousands of miles, when she just had a simple question about her insurance 
policy? At face value, examples like this one—now a common experience for 
consumers—show us that information and communication technologies (ICts), 
and in particular the internet,2 have created awe-inspiring means to bridge 
geographical distance, in this case for a business seeking to access low-cost 
labour in low-income countries.
Yet, if we probe a little further and ask “why this particular call centre and 
why Rwanda?” or “why do we see such outsourcing in some industries and 
for some tasks but not for others?”, the potential explanations immediately 
become more complicated. Maybe there was a subsidy, or maybe Rwandan 
service workers were deemed to be particularly skilful for this sort of work 
compared to workers in other countries, or maybe a procurement specialist 
for the insurance company happened to meet a representative of the 
Rwandan development Board (RdB) at a conference, who later brokered 
a deal with the call centre manager. In short, if we start thinking through 
questions around the dynamics of globally distributed flows of information 
and value creation, we quickly see that even the simplest interactions can 
be preceded by intricate, complex and socially embedded interactions and 
decision-making processes of economic actors.
this report examines if and how the internet can enable development of 
an industry that is predicated on bridging geographical distances between 
low-income and high-income countries via ICts: the business process 
outsourcing (BPo) sector.3 we selected the local BPo sectors of Kenya and 
Rwanda as case studies for a number of reasons. Both countries have sought 
to benefit from an incisive event for the ICt landscape of East Africa: the 
arrival of the region’s first submarine fibre-optic cables to the coasts of Kenya 
and tanzania in 2009. our research team felt that this large-scale upgrading 
of internet infrastructure offered a unique opportunity to empirically examine 
the short and medium-term effects of ICts on economic development, and 
also to compare visions and hopes with the realities that have materialized 
over the last five years. Moreover, policymakers in both countries have 
singled out BPo as a potential game changer for employment opportunities 
and economic transformation. this means that the sector could serve as an 
important test-bed for the hopes around global connectivity and integration 
wrapped up with the arrival of the cables.
As our introductory example suggests, concrete contexts and histories 
shape the ways in which actors engage with technology, and thus needed to 
be taken into account for this analysis. Even more importantly, the present 
case is an industry that is inherently based on interactions between actors 
that span (sometimes very large) geographical distances, and so we found 
it useful to hone in on the very notion of ‘connectivity’. In other words, while 
much popular discourse around globalisation paints a picture of individuals 
seamlessly connecting to other individuals on the other side of the planet once 
infrastructure is in place, it is essential to remain sensitive to the intermediating 
influences that build cognitive and perceptual connections between actors: 
connections that are based on technological connectivities.
Ultimately, we needed to broaden our understanding of connectivity far beyond 
internet connectivity, in the sense of mere technology-enabled accessibility. For 
us, the focus was the real changes in opportunities and outlook of economic 
actors, and so we saw enhanced internet access only as a means to desired 
ends, such as business deals, increased revenues, employment, learning, 
economic inclusion, integration and transformation, and so forth. this 
meant that we examined the more far-flung effects of the new technological 
infrastructure in East Africa by also scrutinizing changes in actors’ social and 
conceptual connectivities (Graham & Mann, 2013) as well as enablers that are 
complementary to internet connectivity.
the project used a value chain and value production network perspective 
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Coe, dicken & Hess, 2006) to analyse the relations between 
any actors involved in ‘bringing goods to the market’. we also employed ideas 
of (dis)intermediation and positionality in order to conceptually underpin some 
of the work (French & Leyshon, 2004; Graham, 2008; Klein & werthener, 1999). 
several of the arguments made in this report, including the idea of conceptual 
connectivity (a collective and a priori trust between East African companies 
and foreigners), were articulated earlier for an academic audience in a paper 
published by two of the authors (Graham & Mann, 2013).
this conceptual focus is also at the heart of two important clarifications 
concerning the scope of this report. First, we broadened our sample beyond 
just BPo enterprises to include a broader array of ICt companies. this was 
necessary because we quickly found that only a limited amount of BPo work 
was actually taking place in both countries. this broadening of focus was also 
useful because we saw that the value chains and networks of BPo companies 
were closely related and interconnected with other subsectors of local ICt 
industries. second, we were interested in economic opportunity created 
through BPo, and so the locus of value creation and extraction, as well as 
(working) conditions for the involved actors, mattered. 
the report is a unique contribution as an in-depth analysis of impact of 
changing connectivity on an inherently internet-reliant, high-profile industry 
in low-income countries. this is a different approach than previous studies 
that have mainly focused on the positive impact of ICts when they are applied 
to existing sectors in African economies (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Chowdury and 
wolf, 2003; donner, 2005, 2007; Moloney, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Morawczynski 
and Ngwenyama, 2007; Morawczynski, 2009; Mihasonirina and Kpodar, 2011; 
waverman et al., 2005).
the report is structured as follows: As context and background, chapter 2 gives 
readers an overview of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s ICt landscape, charting out the 
infrastructural conditions that the emerging BPo sectors have sought to latch 
onto. Chapter 3 includes a short literature review and describes our analytical 
approach based on the value chain and value network concepts. Chapter 4 
summarizes our data collection and methodological approach. Chapters 5 to 
7 present our findings, starting with the categorization of subsectors relevant 
for understanding the BPo value chains and networks, followed by in-depth 
analyses and a discussion chapter. Chapters 8 and 9 provide our policy 
recommendations and conclusions.
established through personal contacts and social relations, which are rarely 
‘born online’. Enabling temporary geographic proximity and venues for face-to-
face interaction—for example, during events, conferences, and business and 
outreach trips—thus remains an important goal for governments and industry 
associations, even in the BPo sector.
5 Building a sector’s reputation
By definition, connectivity-based enterprises work with customers and 
suppliers that are in a different location, so that trust is particularly hard to 
establish and sustain. If clients are generally sceptical of a country’s sector, 
an individual enterprise will find it difficult to obtain a chance at proving itself. 
Government agencies, policy, and industry associations have a role to play in 
ensuring a good overall reputation of a sector. Certification programs could be 
one important lever. Another way might be to set up platforms that enhance 
matchmaking, accountability and the enforceability of contracts. 
6 Setting realistic expectations for  
 collective learning
Implementation of technological infrastructures, including ICt and internet 
connectivity, is important, but actors need time to experiment and iterate 
through generations of value chains and networks that work for their context. 
Competitive advantages need to be identified and tested, and risks need to 
be taken. Policymakers and institutional actors need to allow for collective 
learning and knowledge spillovers between different actor groups and between 
different geographies and social contexts to support iterative improvements 
and adjustments.
Conclusions
our study outlined how policy, popular discourse and media got somewhat 
carried away by the promise of internet connectivity as the fuel for the growth 
of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s BPo sectors. the development of ICt sectors fell 
short of many original hopes. Internet connectivity proved to only function as a 
catalyst for economic growth in combination with other enablers, even for the 
examined sectors of connectivity-based enterprises. Competitive advantage is 
always relative, and, in the case of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s BPo sectors, India 
and other Asian BPo destinations have maintained the edge in international 
markets. despite the overall positive evolution of ICt-based subsectors in 
Kenya and Rwanda, the role of internet connectivity for growth in knowledge 
economies continues to be a complicated one, including for connectivity-based 
enterprises. Future opportunities might actually lie in ‘close’ (local and regional) 
markets, and policymakers and indeed all economic actors will need to 
continue to learn and adjust to other unexpected developments brought about 
by internet connectivity.
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second, the Rwandan government has sought to encourage 
entrepreneurship and private sector development from within the country. 
It established the Kigali Institute of science and technology (KIst) to boost 
the country’s number of advanced technology students. students are 
sent abroad for training in advanced engineering,9 and the government 
convinced Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) to open a graduate degree 
program for East African students in Kigali. A technology innovation hub, 
k-Lab, was financed by the government, with the goal to spur technology 
entrepreneurship among Kigali’s tech-savvy youth. 
Kenya
ICT and internet infrastructure and policy
Kenya’s story has been significantly different from Rwanda’s. Besides its own 
investment in the tEAMs cable, the government has largely allowed the private 
sector to spread mobile telephony and internet connectivity to its population. 
the main mobile network operators driving infrastructure deployments are 
safaricom, Airtel, Essar and telkom Kenya (operating under the orange brand). 
Even though the government’s strategy to achieve its goals was different 
to Rwanda’s, the overall goals are relatively similar. Like Rwanda, Kenya 
developed an overall economic development plan, dubbed Vision 2030 
(Republic of Kenya, 2007a; 2007b). Although the focus on ICts is not as explicit 
as in the case of Rwanda’s Vision 2020, the Kenyan government also argued 
that the country should reduce its dependence on the agricultural sector and 
instead hone in on the export of services (Kenyan ICt Board, 2009). the arrival 
of fibre-optic cable in Mombasa was subsequently seen as an important 
enabler for this economic transformation. the policies were paralleled by an 
enhanced sense of optimism and an impending ‘ICt revolution’ (Graham & 
Mann, 2013). 
Kenya is widely considered to be an East African success story in the realm of 
ICts because of its status as a Pan-African ‘ICt Hub’. Furthermore, it already 
is characterised by relatively impressive ICt penetration statistics. For the last 
quarter of 2013, the Communications Authority of Kenya (which succeeded 
the Communications Commission of Kenya) reported a mobile subscription 
penetration of 76.9%, a broadband penetration of above 3% and an internet 
penetration (using the broadest definition of ‘internet’) of 52.3%, of which 99% 
were mobile internet subscriptions (CAK, 2014).
The evolving BPO sector and policy phases
Compared to Rwanda, Kenya’s BPo sector has a longer history. In this 
section, we therefore give a brief chronological outline of the changing state 
of the sector. we will focus on the broad strokes of government policies that 
accompanied the sector’s evolution, leaving a more in-depth analysis of lessons 
from this history for chapter 6.
2007-2011: BPo as a key government strategy for economic growth
BPo was one of the six key sectors explicitly highlighted in the Kenyan 
government’s Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007a; 2007b). In 2007, before 
the arrival of the cables, the BPo sector in Kenya employed only about 4,000 
people, contributing about 0.01% to the nation’s GdP (Republic of Kenya, 2007a; 
omondi, 2012). still, BPo was estimated to ultimately create at least 20,000 
direct jobs and contribute 10 billion Kenyan shillings (Usd120 million) to the 
country’s GdP; this economic impact was expected to be generated both by 
Kenyan firms and large multinationals. the hope was that BPo would become 
the “sector of choice [for] employment among youth and young professionals” 
(Republic of Kenya, 2007a: 81).
Envisioning Kenya as the top digital offshoring destination in Africa, the 
government called for the creation of a 7,500 seat ‘BPo park’ at the Athi-River 
Export Processing Zone, an aggressive marketing campaign, the development 
of targeted training programmes, the development of a BPo incentive 
framework and initiation of a BPo and Contact Centre policy.10 the government 
also established the semi-autonomous Kenya ICt Board, which, among other 
goals, was set to promote the BPo sector. 
Like the Rwandan government, the Kenyan government intervened to reduce 
bandwidth costs, but it focused more directly on the BPo sector. In 2007, the 
Kenyan government used 78 million Kenyan shillings (about Usd920,000) from 
the world Bank transparency Communication and Infrastructure Programme 
(tCIP)11 to subsidise the cost of satellite bandwidth for BPo companies while 
the country waited for the East African submarine fibre-optic cables to arrive. 
this case illustrates that the government put much emphasis on BPo over 
other ICt subsectors: it effectively used funding that was originally earmarked 
for e-government to promote the BPo sector. 
In 2009, the government commissioned the consulting company McKinsey 
to compile a report on Kenya’s niche within the global market for BPo/ItEs 
(Kariuki, 2010). It confirmed that Kenya could become competitive in niche 
call centre and customer service work, stressing, in particular, the neutral 
English accent of Kenyan graduates. the Kenya ICt Board also visited 
countries such as India and the Philippines to learn how these countries had 
developed their BPo sectors. the Board’s immediate mission was to find and 
develop Kenya’s particular national comparative advantage vis-à-vis other 
destinations in the world. 
2011 onwards: a shift towards high-value added ICt services
Following the first experiences after the arrival of the cables, the government 
started to change its approach. In particular, it shifted attention away from call 
centres to higher-value producers like software engineers, most visibly in the 
celebration of cases like M-Pesa12 and Ushahidi13. Government officials also 
began to realise the potentials of automation to centralise rents and reduce 
corruption (Mutai, 2013). For example, in an interview, the Permanent secretary 
of ICt, Bitange Ndemo revealed how the automation of the Land Ministry had 
increased government revenue from Ksh800 million (Usd9.6 million) to Ksh8 
billion (Usd96 million); he was keen to automate other government services.
In line with this tendency to take other ICt-based industries into account, 
by 2012, the Kenyan ICt Board had changed its mandate from promoting 
BPo to promoting ICt services at large. similarly, the 7,500-seat BPo park 
in Athi River was re-conceptualized as ‘Konza City’, a more general kind of 
‘technopolis’. BPo, for instance, was only mentioned in passing at the ground 
breaking ceremony in 2013. the Kenyan government has also started to 
engage more actively with the emerging entrepreneurial and ICt startup 
communities forming around the iHub and other technology innovation hubs 
in Nairobi (Gathege & Moraa, 2013; Graham & Mann, 2013). For example, 
the Kenya ICt Board, with support of a world Bank loan, funded the Nailab 
business accelerator, located in the same building as the iHub, in early 
2013. In sum, the Kenyan government has largely shifted away from its 
narrowly focused promotion of BPo towards the encouragement of broader 
ICt entrepreneurship and the modernization of its public services and 
government programmes. 
2. intErnEt connEctivity and govErnmEnt policy 
in KEnya and rwanda
Before delving deeper into the analysis of value chains and networks in 
the Kenyan and Rwanda BPo sectors, it is necessary to arrive at a basic 
understanding of the ICt infrastructure and policy conditions in both places, 
as well as high-level information on the BPo sector and the governments’ 
BPo-related policies. Concerning the bigger picture around the arrival of the 
undersea fibre-optic cables as well as Rwanda’s and Kenya’s ICt infrastructure 
and policy, this chapter gives an overview, but readers can refer to other 
sources for more in-depth information.4
East Africa was the last major geographic region of the world connected to 
the global fibre-optic grid, but by 2010, three undersea fibre-optic cables 
connected the region to international networks.5 these cables brought the 
possibility of much lower internet costs and higher internet speeds to the 
countries of the region.
However, users were not automatically ‘switched on’ after their arrival. the 
fibre-optic cables brought bandwidth to the ports of Mombasa and dar es 
salaam, but much work was, and is, needed to transport that bandwidth into 
homes and offices. Mobile telephony and wireless technologies have played a 
much stronger role for ‘last-mile’ access in Kenya and Rwanda compared to 
high-income countries: fibre-connected buildings use wi-Fi extensively, and 
2G+, 3G and most recently 4G mobile technology (from low to high bandwidth) 
has been deployed, enabling mobile internet access. Although the economies 
of such technology are more favourable to an East African context than the 
extensive roll-out of fixed-line internet infrastructure to individual households, 
the cost per connected user is still often prohibitive in sparsely populated areas, 
which limits scaling economies of networks at large (williams, 2010), meaning 
that affordability issues remain for private households as for businesses. 
the following sections look at the changing internet connectivity in Rwanda 
and Kenya. It also expands on how their respective economic plans, Vision 
2020 and Vision 2030, have influenced the development of internet and ICt 
infrastructure. Rwanda and Kenya have very different patterns of internet 
connectivity, partly as a result of their geography and partly as a result of their 
governance structures.
Rwanda
ICT and internet infrastructure
Rwanda has witnessed a dramatic transformation in digital connections 
over the past decade. Almost all of the country (99.79%) is now covered by 
mobile telephony networks, with a subscriber base of over 5 million as of 
september 2012 (or 48.1% of the population) (RdB, 2013). the RdB projects 
that this number will expand to almost 7.5 million by the end of 2016. this 
transformation has taken place within the context of continuous GdP growth 
reaching 8.0% in 2012 (world Bank, 2013).6
while the private sector has undoubtedly been growing, it is important to stress 
that the Rwandan government has played a much stronger role in the roll-out 
of its country’s internet infrastructure than the Kenyan government has in 
Kenya. with its small and predominantly poor population, the country was 
not initially attractive to international telecommunication companies seeking 
new markets. At the same time, Rwanda’s relatively high population density 
implied that the country is suitable and amenable to subsidized or government-
led infrastructure projects (see Friederici, 2013, for examples). the Rwanda 
development Board (RdB) laid a national fibre-optic backbone that connected 
all towns and cities in the country, and constructed a lot of infrastructure in the 
capital city of Kigali through the Kigali Metropolitan Network. the government 
also helped fund the entrance of the south African company, MtN into Rwanda 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013). while MtN still dominates, 
two other companies, tigo and Airtel have since entered the market. 
Even after laying the physical backbone, the government discovered that 
regional internet service providers (IsPs) were having trouble negotiating 
access to international connectivity from Kenya and tanzania. It therefore 
opted to buy bulk capacity from international suppliers at wholesale rates 
for domestic redistribution. It has given responsibility over this bandwidth 
to the Broadband systems Corporation (BsC), a private company in which 
the government is a majority shareholder. these interventions have made it 
possible for smaller IsPs to enter the market, particularly in areas with lower 
demand, resulting in slashed wholesale bandwidth costs that decreased by 
75% (Government of Rwanda, 2012). 
the government has also played a strong role in convincing the international 
payment company, Visa to choose Rwanda as its African headquarters. In 
2011, the company introduced the Rwanda Integrated Payments Processing 
system, thus facilitating electronic payments within the country (Crisafulli and 
Redmond, 2012). this system has now been integrated with wider regional 
payment systems like the East African Economic Community’s (EAEC) 
Common Market Protocol and the Common Market for Eastern and southern 
Africa’s (CoMEsA) Regional Payment and settlement system (Maiyambere, 
2012; Mbabazi, 2012). these integrations are intended to prepare the country to 
become a regional trade and financial hub. 
High-level policy strategy for BPO sector
Concrete and reliable information on the size and shape of the Rwandan BPo 
sector is scarce. one estimate by the private sector consultancy on the Frontier 
Group (otF, 2010, as cited by the New times Rwanda, 2010) held that the 
sector would grow from Usd29 million in 2009 to Usd274 million in 2020, with 
the RdB citing similar figures in unofficial documents (RdB, no date). However, 
no information is available on the methodologies and assumptions underlying 
such estimates. In this section, we therefore only briefly highlight the Rwandan 
government’s high-level approach to BPo.
the government’s hands-on role in the Rwandan ICt and internet industry 
is based on its goals to generate ICt-led economic growth. these ambitions 
are outlined in the government’s national development plan, Vision 2020 
(Government of Rwanda, 2000), focusing much more explicitly on ICts 
than most other countries’ economic development policies.7 the plan’s 
overarching goal is to build a knowledge-based economy and make Rwanda 
a middle-income country by 2020. As Rwanda lacks natural resources, it has 
strongly emphasized the education and skill development of its people.
In this context, the Rwandan government has identified BPo to have particular 
potential to generate economic growth. However, Rwanda’s strategy differs 
markedly from that of Kenya. Instead of supporting the establishment of new 
Rwandan BPo operations, the goal is instead to nurture existing firms with 
BPo potential (in niche fields) and aim to attract international BPo players.
the government has attempted to implement this vision for the BPo sector 
with two broad strategies. First, the government (via the RdB, the Ministry 
of Youth and ICts, and the Rwandan ICt Chambers) seeks to attract large 
international companies to set up regional headquarters in the country and 
help upgrade the country’s infrastructure.8 the government hopes Rwandan 
workers and businesses will benefit from these arrangements through 
knowledge transfer and revenue-sharing arrangements.
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to ICts and the internet, these technologies can function as drivers of such 
‘conceptual connectivity’, irrespective of immediate, palpable realities (Graham 
& Mann, 2013).
Value chains and value networks
the final, most important analytical concept that we employ concerns the ideas 
of value chains and value networks. simply put, any activity that is involved in 
bringing a product or service to the market is meant to create an addition of 
economic value, which is added to the input factors. when distinct activities and 
tasks are involved and when they follow each other in a linear process in the 
production, one can think of a value chain. A value chain is thus an analytical 
device that can be used to show how different entities or different actors 
within an entity add value to a good or service as it moves from conception 
to distribution and consumption (Porter, 1985). Importantly, actors holding 
certain positions in value chains and value networks can generate strategic 
advantages, power or dominance over other actors in the chain or network.
these concepts are well-researched, and the literature on value chains 
is much more comprehensive than the overview presented in this outline. 
Gereffi, Humphrey and sturgeon (2005), for example, developed an intricate 
typology of global value chains with five categories, ranging from ‘market’ to 
‘modular network’ to ‘relational network’ to ‘captive network’ and then finally, 
to ‘hierarchy’. this typology is based on the degree of explicit coordination 
required to structure interaction between actors in the value chain. 
their model can be interpreted as a way of charting the level of direct 
coordination required in different market settings. In some industries, overt 
hierarchical control is needed to bring goods to the market, while in others 
the price mechanism or the support of intermediaries can suffice. setting 
structures and (national) standards and frameworks for value chains can be 
a means to establish a minimum quality and accordingly a national or sector 
brand (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005).
when we assume that this process is less linear and closed off, and that 
multiple different actors get involved in a particular element of the chain, 
one can speak of value networks. For instance, Coe, dicken and Hess (2008: 
6) argue that “[i]n reality, each stage of a production chain is embedded in 
much wider sets of non-linear/horizontal relationships”. while it is prudent 
not to get too weighed down in terminology, the utility of the ‘value network’ 
concept is that it encourages reflexivity about the wider social, political and 
cultural environments in which producers and consumers find themselves. In 
particular, we can easily think of examples where value chains of related firms 
and sectors, locally and globally, have intricate interactions with the value chain 
of a particular firm, forming value networks at various levels.
this report uses these two concepts, value chains and value networks, 
to analyse the impact that changing internet connectivity has had on the 
Rwandan and Kenyan BPo sectors and the economic opportunities within 
them. with a physical commodity like tea, it is usually easy to point to 
places on a map and say, ‘this is where these activities are located’. when 
it comes to ICt services, it is a little harder to envision the value chain, both 
geographically and procedurally. Information flows through digital networks, 
and while these digital networks have a tangible geography (in the form of 
wires, satellites, servers, or IP addresses), they are more difficult to pinpoint 
as geographical flows on a map.
Instead, it can be more useful to ask how much of the created value is captured 
or extracted (for example, in the form of wealth, salaries, earnings, jobs) within 
geographical entities (like Kenya or Rwanda) or organisational entities. If 
Rwandan and Kenyan policymakers and businesspeople want their countries 
to become important destinations for ICt industries, they need to have a grasp 
of how value creation and extraction in value chains works, and how different 
market structures or forms of state intervention might change where and how 
value moves. 
***
this report integrates these ideas around ICts and geographical distance, 
re-intermediation, trust and conceptual connectivity, as well as value chains 
and networks, to analyse the changes that the arrival of the fibre-optic cables 
in East Africa have brought about for the Kenyan and Rwandan BPo sectors. 
It will show where and how value creation takes place, and also who is able to 
extract value. we will draw out commonalities between the two countries, and 
will summarize (1) how our respondents perceived the changing connectivity’s 
impact on geography and geographical distance; (2) how changing connectivity 
has changed access to information and abilities to communicate and conduct 
economic exchanges directly and indirectly with other local, regional and 
international actors; and (3) how changing connectivity has impacted value 
chain and network configurations.
3. valuE chains and valuE nEtworKs
In this short chapter, we will outline the theories and analytical perspectives 
that we used to analyse the BPo sectors of Rwanda and Kenya. Namely, we 
are drawing on a value chain / (global) value production network perspective 
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Coe, dicken & Hess, 2008). In the following, we first give 
brief pointers to additional important concepts and streams of literature—
including ICts and distance, and (dis)intermediation and trust—before we 
describe value chain / value network ideas in more depth. 
ICts’ role for distances, (dis)intermediation and 
economic opportunities
Many authors have pointed to the ways that ICts can help economic actors 
transcend geographical or political barriers, with those in economically 
marginalised areas seen to be afforded tools to overcome spatial isolation and 
exploitation (Graham & Mann, 2013). such proclamations often use metaphors 
like the ‘global village’ (McLuhan, 1968) or the ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross, 
2001). while such proclamations are often repeated in popular media and 
casual conversations, we would instead look to more nuanced understandings 
of the intersections between ICts, distance, and geography (e.g. Graham, 1998). 
technology does not unfold in a neutral way, but is shaped and informed by 
networks of actors who use it in unique and culturally specific ways in each 
geographical location and social context. 
Contexts do not only impact technology; technologies also play a role in 
the production of space, place, and location. For example, ICts are often 
described as ‘reducing distance’ and ‘improving connectivity’. ICts can also 
do the opposite, creating new barriers and new kinds of memberships. 
An increased capacity to communicate at a distance has the potential to 
both increase and decrease instances of face-to-face communication, and 
to stretch and shrink distance (see for example Morawczynski, 2009 for a 
discussion of M-Pesa, remittances and frequency of ‘trips home’).
ICts have also been described as a potential source of disintermediation, 
allowing actors who do not reside in a proximate geographical or social 
environment to “cut out the middle man” and communicate and interact 
more directly and effectively. Yet, other research has clearly shown how ICt 
should in fact be understood through the concept of ‘re-intermediation’; the 
technology and innovations, their social configuration and their ordering 
systems have been created by humans, which can imply that the ‘experts’ 
involved in constructing these models and systems themselves replace older 
intermediaries as new intermediaries, in particular, in dynamic change and 
power perspectives (French & Leyshon, 2004; Graham, 2008; MacKenzie et 
al., 2007; Klein & werthener, 1999).
when the effects of ICts on distance and disintermediation are applied to 
economic opportunities, offshoring and outsourcing industries immediately 
come to mind. In the past, the offshoring of jobs from one place to another 
was partly determined by the extent to which tradable goods produced by 
such labour could be packaged into ‘boxes’. A distinction emerged between 
jobs in manufacturing and jobs in non-manufacturing. with the advent of 
contemporary ICts and the internet, a new distinction is taking form instead, 
“between those types of work that are easily deliverable through a wire (or via 
wireless connections) with little or no diminution in quality and those that are 
not” (Blinder, 2006: 118). In particular for large ICt-based businesses, this 
means that both agglomeration and dispersion economies can be exploited, 
depending on task requirements like creativity, routinisation, the complexity 
of coordination, and the possibility of codification for a given task (Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane, 2003; Leamer and storper, 2001; Malecki & Moriset, 2007; 
Moriset & Malecki, 2009). 
the prime example for ICt-based offshoring is probably the emerging economies 
in Asia, which have been able to carve out niches as sites of technologically 
mediated service provision. India, in particular, by virtue of its well-educated and 
English-speaking workforce, has become the offshoring destination of choice for 
many companies.
However, even for India, as the nation widely acclaimed as the foremost BPo 
success story, closer analysis reveals a picture that is patchier than the ideal 
of equally distributed or inclusive economic growth. For example, urban, 
well-educated, middle-class and privileged castes dominate the BPo industry 
(Nijman, 2006). such socio-demographic patterns can also have effects 
beyond their obvious implications for inclusion and exclusion of groups 
from opportunities, as they can translate into far-reaching consequences 
for society as a whole. For example, reverse migrants (i.e. Indians returning 
mainly from the Us to start businesses and lives in India) can have markedly 
different political and ideological views from other Indians (Fuller & 
Narasimhan, 2006; Upadhya, 2007). Finally, the vision of the BPo industry 
as a creator of choice employment for large numbers of people has not fully 
materialized: observations pointing to tight surveillance and heavy-handed 
management practices, such as the regulation of accents and identity, but 
also the repetitiveness of BPo work and its emotional cost have called this 
assertion into question (Bryson, 2007; Mirchandani, 2004). 
trust, reputation and conceptual connectivity
when we think more about the underlying mechanisms that let ICts and the 
internet bridge geographical distances to enable economic opportunities, we 
discover that social connectivity is usually required beyond internet connectivity. 
If we think about the types of exchanges and deals in the BPo sector, it is easy 
to see that the two (or more) actors that conclude the economic transaction 
will have established some sort of social relation beforehand. the service 
provision itself (e.g. the call of a client of an insurance company being dealt with 
by a Rwandan agent) might be adequately described as a ‘pure’ information 
exchange between actors, but the economic interaction between BPo 
customer and supplier that necessarily precedes this service provision (e.g. an 
insurance company signing a service agreement with a Rwandan call centre) 
will certainly require a more sustained and socially embedded relation between 
actors, irrespective of them involving ICts in this process.
In this context, trust between the parties plays a distinct role. only if a minimum 
level of trust is present will business deals be concluded. Here, personal 
relationships might play a strong role, and brokers might be required to mediate 
between otherwise unacquainted customers and suppliers. one question for our 
empirical enquiry then is whether ICts and the internet can help to establish such 
trust, or if other, complementary enablers need to establish the trust for ICts to 
be able to afford their distance-bridging and shrinking potential. 
However, beyond the trust that is manifest in personal relationships between 
actors, a country’s, or a sector’s reputation at large can play a strong role in 
attracting or discouraging economic activity. Foreign clients and investors 
will often apply preconceptions of ‘BPo in Kenya’ / ‘BPo in Rwanda’ or even 
just ‘Kenya’ / ‘Rwanda’, instead of going through the exercise of carefully 
contextualizing and differentiating between subnational regions, demographies, 
different service providers and so forth. this is arguably where national policy 
matters most, as it might have a more immediate effect on this broader, 
collective concept of trust and reputation. For instance, legal and regulatory 
frameworks might secure the faith of clients abroad in East African companies 
and entrepreneurs, or ratings and reports from international agencies might 
shape foreign (but also local) customers’ broad-based perceptions. Importantly, 
given the symbolism and ideologies that policy and societies at large attach 
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Kenyan) BPo sectors were less active than had been envisioned. the team 
also became aware that the business models and strategies of companies 
that formed the BPo sector were still developing, and still trying to adapt to 
market conditions. In the period of our research, there was hence a lot of 
uncertainty and speculation in the sector about its evolution. For instance, 
one international BPo consultant felt that Kenya’s BPo potential could be 
catalysed if a local BPo firm would get a large client and ‘pull’ other business 
into the country, or if a large multinational BPo company entered Kenya in 
order to do local work. For these reasons, we needed to interview additional 
actors who could help shed light on potential barriers and interactions 
between connectivities and enabling factors.
we then included other kinds of ICt-based companies in our sample. this 
broadening of the sample was based on an important emerging finding in 
our research: the value chains of other subsectors of local ICt industries 
formed interconnected value networks together with BPo value chains, 
and it was essential to look at dynamics outside of the BPo sector to 
understand the BPo sector itself (see chapters 5 and 6 for details). the 
adjustment of scope also made sense as policymakers in both countries 
had come to recognize that the promotion of international BPo was likely to 
require more fundamental changes in the structure of Kenya and Rwanda’s 
domestic economies.
Particularly in Rwanda, where the BPo sector was at an incipient stage, we 
attempted to include companies that had the potential to engage in BPo in 
the future. we included a range of engineering, legal, financial and advertising 
agencies. our researchers also sought out interviews with Rwandan 
telecommunication providers, due to their potential to become BPo clients in 
the future, and with local call centre and BPo providers. similarly, in Kenya, 
we aimed at interviews with large multinational financial companies that were 
investigating the potential of the local BPo market. 
Additionally, while the team had initially designed the project to analyse 
the impact of fibre-optic connectivity on East Africa’s potential to engage in 
international flows of BPo work, the early fieldwork prompted a significant 
re-focusing away from the international market towards BPo work for actors in 
the domestic and regional economies. the team also discovered that most ICt 
innovators—a group included in addition to the BPo sector (see chapter 5)—
were more interested in developing software for regional markets, even if they 
had the capacity to conduct coding work for clients from outside of the region. 
transcription, coding and analysis
After the fieldwork had been completed in both countries, two transcription 
companies were used to transcribe the recorded interviews. A Kenyan BPo 
company was employed to transcribe the bulk of the interviews, while a second, 
non-East African company transcribed interviews where there was a potential 
conflict of interest, namely for the interviews conducted with companies 
engaged in transcription work themselves. 
Ninety-nine of the interviews were coded using N-Vivo, a qualitative analysis 
software package designed to allow users to organise unstructured text, 
and therefore examine relationships between ideas and statements in 
interviews. the researchers read through the transcriptions, coding areas 
of text where ideas or emerging themes were being discussed. this close 
coding of the interviews allowed the research team to identify common 
experiences and ideas shared across the sample of interviews, but also to 
identify interesting exceptions. 
Methodological limitations
our research team acknowledges the necessary limitations of the data 
collection and interview analysis methodology employed in this project. 
transcribed interview data is vulnerable to misinterpretation and artefacts of 
imperfect expression—sometimes participants might not find the appropriate 
words to describe a complex economic dynamic. we also acknowledge that we 
sometimes used provocative and leading questions to stimulate discussion. 
For these reasons, the team has been careful not to take quotations out of 
context, but rather to reflect on how their interviewees expressed themselves 
throughout the entire interview process, clarifying earlier statements and ideas 
at later stages of the interview. 
It was also sometimes difficult to differentiate between respondents’ direct 
experiences and their anticipations and projections. often, participants had 
clear opinions and ideas about the BPo sector and its evolution even when 
the extent of actual economic activity was unclear (indeed, this observation 
motivated our work described in Graham and Mann, 2013). In some ways, the 
fieldwork revealed that it was too early to conduct research about the impact 
of fibre-optic cables on the BPo sectors in East Africa, or that the question is 
in fact posed too narrowly to be answered in a meaningful way. Much more 
of the impact has potentially yet to come, and we found that it can be hard or 
impossible to directly associate the deployment of internet infrastructure with a 
clear, observable development pattern in a given ICt sector.
Finally, different interviewees could relate better to concepts such as ‘value 
chains’ and ‘intermediaries’ than others. BPo operators mostly grasped the 
notion of value chains and intermediaries without additional explanation while 
other ICt-based businesses found it harder to envision such chains. the latter 
were more likely to see themselves as acting independently from others and 
engaging in a disintermediated market. similarly, some interviewees strongly 
identified with ideas about a ‘flattened world’, in particular software developers 
who engaged with open-source communities. these different experiences will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, but it is worth noting how different 
experiences of connectivity were filtered through participants’ engagements in 
particular kinds of work and information flows. the research team often had to 
adapt the interview guide on the spot, to account for these varied experiences. 
different answers did not necessarily mean contradictions within the sample, 
but rather, different experiences even within similar sectors and fields. our 
team took great care to contextualize each respondent’s statements to account 
for this framing, but we cannot rule out the possibility that we sometimes 
generalized across participants who had very different understandings of 
concepts or terms that we were using.
4. mEthods and data
this chapter describes the four stages of methods employed in our research. 
A team of researchers from the oxford Internet Institute, University of oxford, 
developed an in-depth analytical approach to capture the expected and actual 
impacts of changing connectivity in the Kenyan and Rwandan BPo sectors. 
to systematically examine expectations, we conducted a content analysis of 
media articles discussing the arrival of the fibre-optic cables in the region. 
we also reviewed important policy documents, such as Rwanda’s Vision 
2020 and Kenya’s Vision 2030. In 2010, we also conducted 20 interviews with 
policymakers from BPo firms in Nairobi and in Kigali to further inform the 
project and the design of the survey instrument. we will briefly outline the 
methodology for the content analysis here, but will not discuss the setup stages 
of our research extensively in the present report; instead we refer readers to 
Graham and Mann (2013) for details.
As the main data collection method for the present report, two of the 
authors, together with local partners from the University of Nairobi and the 
University of Rwanda, carried out 102 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with a range of actors in the BPo sectors and ICt-based businesses of 
Nairobi and Kigali. we adapted our data collection method and participant 
sampling throughout the process, before focusing entirely on the data 
analysis in the last year of the project.
Preliminary research: discourse and content analysis
Before we set out to collect information directly from participants, we 
conducted a content analysis of East African media sources to understand the 
hopes and visions invested in the arrival of fibre-optic cables in the region. we 
made use of keyword searches in the Lexis-Nexis online database in order to 
select media accounts of the arrival and perceived impacts of the fibre-optic 
cables. specifically, we identified articles that mentioned broadband internet 
in close proximity to a mention of either an East African country or one of the 
fibre-optic cable providers.
the result was a sample of 378 international and East African media reports 
about the landing of the cables. the sample was developed to be broad enough 
to cover a potentially diverse range of discourses and themes, yet small 
enough to be handled qualitatively so that not only manifest content but latent 
meaning could emerge from the analysis (shoemaker & Reese, 1996: 32). we 
supplemented these texts with an examination of the national development 
plans of all East African nations and speeches given by heads of state about the 
arrival of fibre-optic cables. 
Participant selection and sampling
data collection during fieldwork was mainly done through interviews with 
BPo and other ICt-based businesses, policymakers and representatives 
from private sector associations in both countries. In Kenya, these interviews 
included representatives from the Kenya ICt Board, Bitange Ndemo (at 
the time, the Permanent secretary of ICt), an adviser in the National 
Communication secretariat, the Head of the Communication workers 
Union, and representatives from iHub, mLab East Africa and 88mph (three 
tech hubs and business accelerator programmes in Nairobi). In Rwanda, 
the team interviewed dr Ignace Gatare (at the time, the Minister for Youth 
and ICt) and representatives from the Rwandan ICt Chambers, the Rwanda 
Utilities Regulatory Authority, the Rwandan development Board and kLab (an 
innovation and incubation hub in Kigali). 
In total, 53 interviews were conducted in Rwanda and 49 in Kenya, for a total 
of 102 interviews (each 1-4 hours in length). All interviews were conducted in 
English. Exploratory surveys with workers in Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda were 
also used to get a sense of the experience of workers and developers in both 
countries. 
In all cases, the researchers sought informed consent from participants 
and asked permission to record the interviews. occasionally, an interviewee 
would ask that the researcher treat particular parts of the interview as 
sensitive. In these cases, great attention has been paid to alert the team 
as a whole to handle and interpret this material carefully. some individuals 
also preferred their interviews not to be recorded, in which case the 
researchers took detailed notes. 
with the exception of public figures, specific interviewees have been 
anonymised throughout this report and in related publications in order to 
protect the confidentiality and privacy of participants. Many interviewees 
revealed the challenges of discussing failure in public forums and viewed 
the research project as an opportunity to air more critical views. this was 
particularly true in the ICt innovator sector (see chapter 5 for details), where 
entrepreneurs are under intense pressure to project success and optimism 
about their businesses. our sense was that this confidentiality allowed 
participants to be more honest and less guarded in their interview responses.
towards the end of the data collection period, two open focus groups were 
held in Kigali and Nairobi in May 2013, in which research participants and 
other interested parties were invited to reflect on preliminary findings. A final 
workshop held in August 2014 in Kigali helped to disseminate our research 
and to collect a last round of feedback on our findings from Rwandan BPo 
practitioners that we incorporated in this report. As these sessions were open, 
representatives from additional organisations also attended. 
Interview guide
the initial interview guide was underpinned by three research questions. 
First, how did respondents perceive the impact of changing connectivity on 
geography and distance? second, how has changing connectivity altered direct 
and indirect access to information and partners of economic exchanges? third, 
how has changing connectivity impacted value creation and extraction in value 
chain and network configurations?
Concretely, interviewees were asked about 1) their internet connection, 2) their 
expectations of internet connectivity, 2) their disappointment with internet 
connectivity, 3) their fears concerning internet connectivity, 4) the range, scale 
and geographical scope of their businesses, 5) their ideas about the shape of 
‘value chains’ in their sector, 6) their strategies for getting new clients and for 
raising public awareness about their companies, 7) their experience of barriers 
that prevented them from accessing new markets and customers/clients, 
8) their use of websites and social media, 9) their strategies for gathering 
information and carrying out research and development, 10) their employment 
and recruitment practices, 11) their experiences and ideas about the education 
system in both countries, 12) their experience working with private sector 
associations and with government departments/policymakers, and 13) their 
experiences with processes of ‘disintermediation’ and changing geographies, 
resulting from internet connectivity.  
Methodology adaptation
during fieldwork, the research team adapted both its initial sampling strategy 
and the interview guide to reflect the realities they found on the ground. 
For instance, we quickly found that the Rwandan (and to some extent the 
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chains and business models that depended on ICt and internet infrastructure 
(hardware and software) put in place mostly by local and international ICt 
corporations or government entities, such as subsidized/government-owned 
and private mobile network operators, device manufacturers and software 
multinationals. they were thus categorically distinct from these larger 
providers of primary ICt and internet infrastructure, and they presented us with 
a complex picture of interdependencies and interconnections. the following two 
chapters will describe these interdependencies in more depth, and describe 
how we found that the BPo sector is best understood when looked at together 
with the other identified sectors.
5. valuE nEtworKs of connEctivity-basEd EntErprisEs
our research found that the BPo sectors of Rwanda and Kenya cannot be 
meaningfully understood only by examining the companies within each 
sector. An active BPo sector was only found to exist in Kenya but not in 
Rwanda, and even Kenya’s over a decade-old BPo sector has not been able 
to capture large amounts of work from foreign clients; falling far short of 
original hopes and expectations.
these nascent clusters of economic activity were closely interrelated with 
adjacent subsectors of local ICt industries, even though their value chains were 
distinct. Looking at these interrelations was useful for understanding the BPo 
sectors and their challenges by revealing the dynamics of value networks in 
Kenya’s and Rwanda’s BPo sectors that are interconnected to distinct value 
chains of other subsectors. 
this chapter defines and delineates the BPo sector and two other sectors, 
ICt innovators and ICt connectivity enhancers, as sectors that we found to be 
interconnected in value networks. Based on their commonalities and distinctive 
factors towards other ICt companies, we denote the three sectors together 
as connectivity-based enterprises. this chapter is thus simultaneously a 
description of our research findings and a categorization that is essential to 
understand the actual value chain analysis that we conducted. we describe 
each sector and the umbrella category in this chapter, before the following 
chapter presents in-depth analysis of value chains and networks in the sector.
Business process outsourcing
we define BPo as work that was previously carried out within a firm but that 
is now carried out by an outside entity. we focused specifically on digitally 
enabled, ICt-based BPo as this kind of work can potentially be outsourced 
across greater distances and is ostensibly influenced most by the presence or 
absence of ICt and internet infrastructure. 
we also found it important to distinguish between different geographical 
configurations of BPo work flows. Aside from international inflows of work 
(Rwandan/Kenyan BPo companies conducting work for foreign clients), we 
also found outflows of work (foreign BPo companies conducting work for 
Rwandan/Kenyan clients). we also found domestic BPo work flows (Kenyan/
Rwandan BPo companies serving Kenyan/Rwandan clients). International 
inflows can further be divided into inflows from the region (that is, East Africa), 
from within Africa, and from outside of Africa. A final important distinction 
concerns the origin and/or headquarters of a BPo company: an international 
business can have an office and operations in Rwanda or Kenya, but it remains 
an international company. these differentiations became essential to untangle 
more diverse flow patterns than the typically envisioned inflow of international 
work to Rwandan or Kenyan-based and -born firms.
ICt innovators
the second sector of ICt-based companies with a distinct value chain were 
ICt innovators. this category mainly includes start-ups, entrepreneurs and 
software developers producing new applications and software.14 ICt innovators 
accrue value from their technical abilities and by applying those abilities to sell 
novel ICt products that they develop from scratch or by adapting an existing ICt 
product to a new (local) market—still an ‘innovation’, even if not an ‘invention’. 
Accordingly, this value chain was the most contingent on the availability of 
highly skilled workers. 
while it is imaginable that solutions developed by ICt innovators are sold 
to international clients, this was not the case in our sample: all products 
developed by ICt innovators were designed for and marketed towards 
domestic or regional markets. differentiation (and ultimately the possibility 
of extracting value locally) thus came primarily from combining two forms 
of expertise: technical capabilities and local domain knowledge about the 
contexts or communities at which the product was aimed. 
ICt connectivity enhancers
the third sector was made up of ICt connectivity enhancers. It was more 
diverse and less clearly confined. Examples included electronic payment 
intermediaries, ICt training institutions and trainers, content and platform 
providers, hardware and software suppliers, web advertisers and agencies, 
software developer and web design freelancers not involved with innovations 
(as defined above), etc. what this group of actors has in common is that 
their value creation primarily consists of enhancing the value of internet 
connectivity for others. In other words, connectivity enhancers facilitate 
greater value extraction from internet usage for others. this means that ICt 
connectivity enhancers address clients that are already using the internet 
or ICts but that have an additional unmet (connectivity) need and that aim to 
“get more out of” being connected.
this sector can thus be understood as a sort of secondary infrastructure 
that is necessary for internet connectivity to enable more advanced forms 
of value creation and extraction (where infrastructure is broadly defined). 
this sector is therefore complementary to digital content and applications 
themselves (consumption or usage is the end goal) and also to ICt and internet 
infrastructure in a narrow sense (cables, wires, towers, switches, etc.), which 
usually has very high upfront capital investments and is therefore mostly 
dominated by larger players. this category of connectivity enhancers was more 
prevalent in the Rwandan sample simply because we sampled more BPo 
companies and ICt innovators in Kenya.
Emergent value networks of connectivity-based 
enterprises
the typology of BPo companies, ICt innovators, and ICt connectivity enhancers 
emerged from our non-random, snowball sampling based on early interviews 
with respondents and our focus on understanding the internet’s effect on the 
Kenyan and Rwandan BPo sectors. As a result, it should by no means be 
understood as a comprehensive or representative categorization of ICt-based 
companies. there might also be overlaps; for example, individuals might often 
transition between ICt innovators and ICt connectivity enhancers, depending 
on their opportunities and capacities at a given point in time. 
Yet, we believe that this categorization is useful for addressing our research 
questions. we found these sectors when we expanded our sample beyond 
the companies at the core of the Kenyan and Rwandan BPo sectors. we did 
not pre-specify them but instead the categorization emerged from a snowball 
sample that was constructed iteratively while attempting to understand the 
dynamics that influence the BPo sector. this meant that, by virtue of our 
sampling approach that followed connections starting from (the few) BPo 
companies we found, we uncovered value networks within which the BPo 
sectors’ value chains were embedded and upon which they relied.
once we had finished our data collection, we found that each of these three 
sectors had in common that they consisted of companies that based their 
business model on (internet) connectivity; that is, they are connectivity-based 
enterprises. these businesses provided content and services through value 
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Case study: A Japanese client for a Rwandan software development Firm
After outsourcing an initial batch of work to the Rwandan software 
company, Japanese Rexvirt/ABC Partners is now attempting to broker 
further opportunities for Rwandan companies to engage with other 
Japanese clients (Rexvirt/A.B.C. Partners, 2013a,b). the company 
considers Rwandan developers to have many ‘harmonies’ with the 
Japanese work ethic; such as ‘kaizen’ (good communication skills), 
diligence and shyness and ‘earnestness and honesty’. At the same 
time, the company feels that “Even if there is good harmony, project 
management is also very important. we must make a standard of it” 
(Rexvirt/A.B.C. Partners, 2013a) (see also figure 2). It is in the process of 
developing a model for such further engagement, taking part in trade 
shows and doing surveys to better understand the market. this is a very 
active form of intermediation.
Figure 1: Rexvirt Communications and A.B.C. Partners promotional material15
Figure 2: Source Rexvirt Communications and A.B.C. Partners, 2013a
Figure 3 represents the two forms of engagement that Rexvirt is 
developing for Japanese companies interested in employing Rwandan 
developers. In one, Rexvirt simply makes the initial introduction. In the 
other, it also takes responsibility over project management. when Rexvirt 
surveyed Japanese clients, they found that Japanese firms were most 
interested in the potentials for smartphone application development, 
embedded software development and software development for foreign 
markets, as well as customer data analysis.
to understand the enabling factors for brokering partnerships further, 
Rexvirt carried out an internet survey in January 2013, surveying 183 
Japanese software, It and manufacturing companies. they asked 
respondents whether they would be interested in trying Rwandan 
software development or BPo. while 20% of respondents were positive 
about the possibilities of employing Rwandan developers and BPo 
operators, 60% had concerns, particularly over security, the limited 
number of success cases, the limited advantages in labour cost (as 
compared to Asian countries) and difficulties of ‘imagining’ business 
with African countries over distance. Figure 4 presents the results.
6. in-dEpth valuE chain analysEs
this chapter presents the core empirical findings. It contains answers to the 
project’s research questions about the influence that the arrival of the fibre-
optic cables to the East African coast has had on Kenya’s and Rwanda’s BPo 
sectors. It draws extensively on our categorization of two additional sectors of 
connectivity-based enterprises—ICt innovators and connectivity enhancers—
whose value chains interconnect with the BPo sectors’ value chains, thereby 
forming value networks. this descriptive chapter outlines the three sectors 
of connectivity-based enterprises in turn, for both Rwanda and Kenya. this 
prepares the ground for the next chapter, which compares the three sectors 
and highlights their unique characteristics, their overlaps with other sectors 




we found Rwanda’s BPo sector to be at an incipient stage. the vision of BPo 
as a vibrant global industry that low-income countries can simply tap into 
through low-skill work labour cost advantages was not the picture that we 
found. despite the government’s discussion of BPo in the popular media 
(Majyambere, 2010; Mugisha, 2010) and in policy documents (MINICoM, 2011; 
RdB, 2012), a very limited amount of international BPo work is currently 
flowing into the Rwandan economy. 
we detail some important facets of the sector that explain this overall finding; 
namely the importance of social connectivity, the role of international firms and 
non-typical work flows, as well as open debates and trends in the sector.
social connectivities and the focus on domestic and regional markets
Instead of predominantly serving clients from outside Africa, BPo appeared 
to be limited to domestic and regional markets. Call centres, for instance, 
focused either on the local telecommunications industry or on relatively simple 
local operations, such as taxi cab call-outs. Most international inflows of work 
came from places within the region, most notably from Burundi, Kenya and 
Uganda. Burundi was overwhelmingly the most common destination of choice, 
with several respondents pointing to Rwanda’s higher level of socio-economic 
development. Kenya and Uganda were seen as more established markets. 
this also applied to financial BPo. A handful of financial companies were 
included in the project sample and their operations were focused on the 
domestic market. some handled work for foreign companies operating in 
Rwanda and occasionally in neighbouring countries. when BPo companies 
took on more regional work inflows, they were usually part of a regional 
network of companies, for instance, with headquarters in Nairobi. Many 
Rwandan-based financial companies and call centre and customer service 
businesses were also headed by Kenyan nationals.
Many Rwandan respondents who were able attract international inflows of 
BPo work had personal and family connections abroad that allowed them 
to compete for foreign clients. Accordingly, most managers expressed a 
desire to focus on expanding within Africa; south sudan, tanzania and the 
dRC were mentioned as potential markets in addition to the current target 
countries of Burundi, Kenya and Uganda. French speakers mentioned 
francophone Africa as another potential future target market. If they were 
planning on entering new markets, managers typically felt the need to find 
a local partner in that country.
within the scope of this project, only four companies were discovered that were 
handling inflows of international BPo work from outside of Africa as part of 
their core businesses. these four companies focused on niche work and tended 
to have a mix of international and Rwandan clients. In three of the cases, an 
intermediary helped broker the relationship between the Rwandan firm and 
the international client. In the fourth case, the company’s director had prior 
professional relations with clients after working and living in a foreign country. 
despite changing digitally mediated connectivities, socio-economic connections 
therefore remained necessary for companies to access international markets. 
the first of the four cases is a Rwandan financial company that conducts audits 
and financial accounting for international clients in Europe. In the case of financial 
services, the Rwandan company usually came into contact with international 
clients within Rwanda; international companies would have a project in Rwanda 
and would hire the local BPo company to carry out the Rwandan accounting 
for the project, attracted by the cheaper cost of labour. once the international 
companies started to recognize and trust the company’s competence, they 
offered additional work from their international offices. the BPo company’s 
manager is now considering making BPo a bigger part of his accountancy 
business. As an important lesson, in this case, it was through face-to-face 
interaction in Rwanda that the company was able to initiate a lasting business 
relationship. this resonates with the concept of temporary geographical proximity 
(torre, 2008) as an important initial enabler for sustained (digitally mediated) 
exchanges over distance. 
the second case is a Rwandan-born engineering and design company, doing 
3-d modelling for international firms in the Us and India. the company 
accessed these clients through intermediation via an equipment supplier. the 
BPo company also benefited from training and networking support from a Us-
based company with an interest in developing its partners’ capabilities to use 
a software suite that it supplied. However, when the global recession of 2009 
led to a drop-off of demand in international markets, the Rwandan company 
re-orientated itself towards the local and regional market.
the third and fourth cases conducted mobile application development 
for clients based in the Us and Japan. For the third case, the Rwandan 
development Board (RdB) together with the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan External trade organization 
(JEtRo) had established ties between the Rwandan software development 
company and the Japanese client, Rexvirt Communications/A.B.C. Partners. 
this case is discussed in detail below as the company agreed for us to share 
its story (see box).
2. Why Rwanda
since Rwandan system developers are characteristically similar to Japanese developers, they are adaptive to the Japanese development style which requires flexible decisions in response to 
changes in conditions according to the progress in development. If a methodology that matches well with the Japanese development style further permeates in Rwanda, this country will become 
a more attractive country in offshore projects.
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and process digitisation projects. some also felt that the ICt and internet 
infrastructure needed to be further expanded into rural areas. they stated that 
building up demand within Rwanda would allow developers and managers to 
“hone their skills” before going into other markets. However, many participants 
felt that there was currently a bias against Rwanda-based developers even 
among Rwandan managers, especially within government, where anti-corruption 
legislation required extensive systems and assurances (often using costly or 
complicated international benchmarks or certificates).
opinions diverged whether such a tendering process allowed foreign companies 
to capture contracts, or whether Rwandan developers simply are not up to the 
challenge. In some of our interviews, this issue led into a broader debate around 
potential tradeoffs between product quality and offering opportunities to local 
software and application developers, for instance, in the humanitarian sector. 
Another debate concerned the nature of partnerships between foreign and local 
firms. Participants pointed out that foreign companies currently often either 
collaborate with local companies merely to obtain a local affiliation or when 
they need the local company to maintain their existing and imported systems. 
At the same time, almost all respondents felt that the presence of foreign 
firms within the country was a good thing. Many more successful managers 
said that their success was a matter of exposure, both to training but also to 
international connections and mentors. 
ICT innovators
the value chains and geographical configurations of ICt innovators had several 
links and similarities to the previously outlined dynamics of the BPo sector. 
Most importantly, we found connections regarding the importance of skilled 
workers (in particular in software development), the prevalence of a local and 
regional market focus based on adaptations of existing business models, as 
well as the relevance of a country’s reputation and international and local 
actors’ conceptions of connectivity.
skills
Many people in the ICt innovator sector spoke about the ways that changing 
connectivity has provided opportunities for learning technical skills and 
competencies. one interviewee described how Google was the “best academy”. 
Another explained how it was not just knowledge that internet connectivity 
offered, but a whole work environment, in particular, through the availability of 
open source or free software and software development kits:
[T]here’s a lot of open source software that’s out there, so for me to be 
able to build software or an application, I need a development environment 
on my computer so I can download [the needed software] […] [E]ven for 
our clients to be able to deploy the software that we built for them, we’re 
using a lot of open source software […] [W]ithout open source software, 
ICT startups would not exist in places like this.
we could observe that faster internet speeds and lower prices for bandwidth 
have had a substantial impact on learning and development among a 
select group of highly motivated individuals, but this was usually in tandem 
with personal support and direction, beyond the educational system. Many 
respondents talked about how university education only imparted theoretical 
knowledge. they felt that real knowledge and skill could only be developed 
once they were forced to use that knowledge for practical purposes. However, 
access to such pressure (in the form of internships and work opportunities) 
were few and far between. In other words, while changing internet connectivity 
is providing access to new knowledge and tools, it is important to stress that 
many success stories of innovators have benefited from just a few prestigious 
and extensive innovation competitions and training programs.
there was also a distinct pattern that the most motivated individuals had 
usually received support from non-Rwandan entities. For example, MIt hosted 
a summer program for Rwandan mobile app developers. this program 
appears to have had a profound impact on the personal development of those 
involved. Many of the celebrated success stories came from this program. 
For example, some ICt innovators had been involved in MIt’s 2011 summer 
program in KIst (AItI/MIt, 2011) while others had worked in large companies 
with international workforces. one interviewee stressed the international 
exposure that he received from working in a large telecom company separated 
him from others his age. He said:
I had the opportunity of being approached and exposed to those senior… 
engineers, [who] could challenge me all time. Say for example I have… 
a call, a conference call…I said what the hell is that? Conference call, 
what is that? How am I going to do this? And then I was still very young 
compared to my other workmates. And I was just exposed to it, that whole 
thing and then I started to adapt myself. And the guys just kept telling me, 
(interviewee’s name) you’re doing good….
[The Wall Street Journal] came here and they made an interview and later 
on I find myself in the newspaper. It was kind of crazy, I remember that 
time… I was 25 at that time. Yeah and then I was just saying ooh, what’s 
this? And then… people could just come here and say, hey, (interviewee’s 
name) you know, I read about you. 
It is not straightforward to derive a clear policy recommendation from this 
finding. several of our interviewees stressed that this social and domain nature 
of knowledge and expertise in the software sector, particularly within the open 
source community, means that skills are notoriously hard to certify and teach 
in a traditional education model. A good developer is often judged by his or 
her last project, so in order to know if someone is good, one must have social 
knowledge and subject matter experience about the relevant actors. this is the 
kind of knowledge that builds over time through exposure and social linkages, 
rather than emerging through one-off lessons.
Innovation and local adaptation
Interestingly, ICt innovators embraced the value of local and regional 
adaptations of their products much more outrightly than interviewees in the 
BPo sector. when we asked young developers whether they were threatened 
by foreign software suppliers, most said ‘no’ and instead welcomed the 
competition. Rather than viewing international competition as a threat, 
many spoke about the inevitability of changing business models and how 
entrepreneurs and businesses had to constantly adapt and draw on more than 
one value chain to sustain their businesses.
Many managers in both countries appeared especially flexible to changing 
business models, changing technologies and changing technological 
affordances. For instance, one company both developed data management 
software and found ways to supply cheap laptops to schools. Many developers 
were developing mobile applications for the mass market while also working as 
It consultants to third-party companies. Another interviewee commented:
I’ve been in this industry for 15 years now. Over a five-year period, if you do 
not renew your knowledge, if you do not adapt, you will be out of sync. You 
always need to think about what’s next. How is the industry evolving? What 
are you going to do? What is the next step? And I think it’s very healthy 
for any business and it’s a must in the IT industry otherwise it can be 
guarantee that you will be dead within three to five years.
they also felt that local software developers and innovators were actually 
needed to educate Rwandan client businesses about the need to use software 
and because they understand the local context better. one CEo commented 
that when you are building apps for other markets, “you have to know what’s 
trendy” and also understand that market’s “data usage”. or in the words of 
another CEo of a Rwandan startup:
It’s very important to understand the local market, the culture, because 
we’ve had trouble with people coming in and trying to provide advice and 
they just don’t get the culture. You can’t do things like that simply because 
of the cultural differences.
International firms in Rwanda; outflows of work
Beyond Rwandan-born BPo firms, there was also a notable presence of 
international companies operating in Rwanda. the firms’ local operations 
were usually embedded in more complicated global economic networks. For 
instance, Indian and other foreign businesses often acted as representatives 
for Us hardware and software companies. we included them into the sample 
because they were seen as competition by Rwandan developers. In contrast 
to Rwandan firms, international companies ran private training sessions for 
their workers. often, these training sessions were online, so fast internet 
connectivity was required. one Indian company, for instance, was actually 
getting involved in BPo within Rwanda, managing the printing services of 
many government departments. 
Interestingly, international firms from within the African continent (Kenya and 
south Africa were mentioned as typical countries) were often able to settle in 
Rwanda with the help of large private sector firms (like telecom operators) or the 
government. the firms would win a large tender, enter the country and slowly 
build up its client base among smaller local clients. In other words, the first big 
contract functioned as the anchor, and once it was established, the international 
firm was in a position to compete for smaller contracts with local firms. 
there were also a few instances of foreign companies operating with almost 
entirely Rwandan workforces. For example, Voxiva, a health sMs company 
based in the Us and India, had a skilled Rwanda labour force, and at the time 
of our interviews, it was set to expand into other markets by sending Rwandans 
to establish foreign offices. the respondent from that company also indicated 
that Rwandan workers had made modifications to the company’s software, and 
that those modifications were then used in other places. A similar situation 
existed with an international m-health organization, which employed primarily 
Rwandan employees in its Kigali office. 
there was a second geographical configuration that called into question the 
simple story of BPo work flows as driven purely by labour cost advantages 
for tasks with low skill requirements. Namely, we found outflows of BPo 
work. Usually, this was niche work that could not be performed by a Rwandan 
company, for instance, concerning technical facets of mobile and software 
development. Rwandan BPo clients typically outsourced work either to other 
East African countries (usually Kenya and Uganda) or to India, depending on the 
level of technical expertise required and the manager’s own social networks. 
one interviewee commented that “outsourcing [within Rwanda] is affordable 
but it is hectic to get a lot of support”. while he would have liked to have used 
local companies for easier communication and coordination, he felt that 
“capacity [in Rwanda] is still expensive”. 
trends, debates and demands 
It is useful to summarize a few trends and demands that were voiced by our 
interview and workshop participants. For instance, most business owners 
now aim to focus on local markets in order to first build up their capacity, 
demonstrate success stories and develop systems and procedures that 
would allow them to expand in the future. Most expressed the desire to work 
with partnerships, both with foreign companies within Rwanda and with 
other African firms in new markets. Especially when it came to mobile app 
development, there was a sense that one had to know and understand the local 
market before acting independently. such moderate and reflexive statements 
stand in contrast to the hype and expectations that (media and politicians in) the 
region had built up around the arrival of the submarine fibre-optic cables.
Accordingly, government officials emphasized that, while improving public 
services is their main motivation, the government also recognizes how these 
projects make the country an attractive testing ground for international 
companies wanting to develop and pilot solutions for the rest of Africa and 
other low-income countries. Many policymakers stressed the idea that, with 
this experience, Rwandan workers and consultants might be well-positioned to 
sell their services in neighbouring countries later on.
BPo company representatives also felt that they would benefit if Rwandan and 
regional clients were better educated about the potentials of BPo in particular, 
but also ICt in general. For example, BPo practitioners pointed out that 
government agencies beyond those directly dealing with ICt-related programs 
are not aware of the local BPo sector and its potential to aid ongoing document 
Figure 3: Rexvirt and ABC Partners, 2013a
the manager of Rexvirt/A.B.C. Partners, Masashi takai, felt that his 
company had been only indirectly impacted by fibre-optic connectivity 
in the region, explaining that one of the driving factors behind their 
engagement in the country was the “presence of excellent engineers in 
Rwanda” who “will be driven by enhancement of ICt education” (personal 
communication, November 2013). Yet, it was also acknowledged that 
decision-making processes in the BPo sector can rarely avoid seat price: 
the cost of employing a single worker on a project. this illustrated the cost/





Attitude for offshore BPO with Rwanda Main reason for negative respondents
Reason 1 – Concern for security of Africa
some correspondents showed the feeling of uneasy about security. Recent news about riots and attacks 
by armed group in African countries seems to have bad impact on Japanese impression.
Reason 2 – Too far distance
some respondents showed feeling of uneasy about distance. they seem to feel that it is difficult to have 
dense communication and enough quality control.
Reason 3 – Few success cases
some respondents answered taht it is necessary for starting the business to know more success cases.
Reason 4 – Few advantages in labor cost
some respondents answered that there are cheaper labor cost countries in Asia.
Reason 5 – Few information and cannot imagine
to begin with, it seems to be difficult for some repondents to have business image with African countries.
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Figure 3: Source Rexvirt and ABC Partners, 2013a
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Given lower formality and scale, these companies did not benefit from the 
economies of scale and network effects typical for digital products. Instead, 
they explicitly focused on niches that large ICt companies could not address. 
For example, one interviewee had built up competency and experience in 
interacting with the specificities of the Eastern dRC market. Another identified 
key groups of customers, including teachers/students, nurses/doctors and 
salaried employees, understanding their own specific needs in order to 
customize offerings. operators in these informal value chains had to be highly 
flexible, changing products frequently. they did not typically do well in large 
tenders because they did not have formal guarantees or large capital inlays. 
Generally, as with the case of BPo, many managers engaged with businesses 
that functioned as enablers of ICt usage spoke about how they did not fear 
international competition, because they felt that international investors would 
bring skills and standards, but would still require Rwandans to understand the 
Rwandan market. one Rwandan advertising manager, for instance noted: 
if someone comes …with the knowledge, because anyway to succeed in 
Rwanda, you have to know Rwandese… but we have to get that knowledge. 
So that knowledge, if you add it you add up with … the high standards, 
international companies may really lift the market.
transitions and pathways
while we cannot highlight systematic evidence, there are several relevant 
instances of transitions between economic activities. For example, website 
design was sometimes a useful gateway activity for software developers before 
they could start their own business or find formal and long-term employment. 
Also some of the aforementioned credit intermediaries transitioned into a 
broader set of economic activities, as they developed business contacts and 
acquired greater familiarity with goods and markets. 
some of the most revealing pathways we found were cases in which smaller 
entrepreneurs among ICt connectivity enhancers had begun to transition into 
more formalised relationships by establishing a close working relationship 
with a particular niche foreign supplier. Again, over time, social connections 
and trust allowed actors to enhance their economic transactions and get 
more out of internet connectivity. In such cases, they had the backing of their 
foreign partners and were typically listed as a partner on their websites, 
which meant that prospective additional clients could easily find them. these 
more specialized companies oriented themselves more towards the private 
sector and to NGos than to government, as they faced lower entry costs 
and less stringent tendering requirements. one interviewee explained his 
re-orientation from government tenders towards servicing NGos. we quote a 
large section of the interview in full:
I have shifted…I’m no longer into IT equipment supplying and… in IT 
equipment maintenance, no more because of … how the market is today.
And what has changed?
The change has been that … with IT equipment supplies... now there’s a lot 
of fake computers.
Fake?
Yes. Which are not genuine coming … from Kenya, India and China… if I 
supply those computers, I will get in trouble with customers, just for the 
guarantee. Another thing is that to be able to buy all those equipment…to 
be supplied, it asks for a lot of capital which I don’t have.
why do you need a lot of capital?
Yes, to buy…Because the payment comes later… we don’t sell to the 
private sector. Here the private sector is still small… I was selling 
equipment … to the government and the government is tender processed, 
and then you earn a contract, and then they will pay after the supply. After 
the confirmation, because they could receive notes and…all specifications 
are inspected. 
it takes a long time.
That can take a lot of time. And … to get a loan from the bank you need to 
have … collateral…which I don’t have. So that’s why I said, “Okay, instead 
of getting stressed with this kind of businesses. Better …I stop this and I 
focus on something which is promising.”
so what does that mean?
So … now I’m selling computers. If I have to supply equipment, I supply 
power efficient computers. Manufactured by [a solar computer company]. 
I partner with them and we are working many times with them. I don’t 
supply this equipment… to the government. I supply this equipment to 
NGOs. And the NGO to me, to sign a contract with them, I make sure they 
pay 50 percent as an advance.
Kenya
Business process outsourcing
Kenyan companies have historically found it difficult to get direct access to 
clients and international work. Faster internet connections were seen as a way 
to make this easier, ‘cutting out the middleman’ and enabling Kenya’s access 
to international clients and levelling the playing field between Kenyans and 
competitors in Asia. our research shows that this has not happened. Almost 
all interviewees ultimately expressed how geography and distance continues 
to be important factors and how the fibre-optic cables have not removed 
intermediaries in the sector. 
the Kenyan fieldwork in the BPo sector revealed a greater level of activity and a 
longer history of practice than the Rwandan case. the concepts of value chains 
and intermediation also seemed to be more prevalent in our participants’ own 
understandings of the sector. As a result, in contrast to the preceding section 
on Rwanda, we will take a more historical and chronological perspective in this 
section on Kenya, presenting illustrations of value chains from the perspective 
of participants. within the BPo sector we focused specifically on data services, 
excepting call centre work. 
Understanding Kenya’s BPo history
Informal beginnings and a promising period of professionalisation
In the early 2000s, Kenyan companies began experimenting with informal BPo 
work. Internet cafés were transformed into BPo operations afterhours, taking 
on small amounts of work from online outsourcing platforms like guru.com, 
elance, o-desk, and u-test.16 stories about such companies fuelled optimism 
about the potential for BPo in Kenya. Because Kenyan companies had easily 
gained access to this kind of informal work without any intervention from 
government or private sector associations, many within the country assumed 
that the country’s potential could be scaled up with the right types of capacity 
building and training.  
Established businesspeople started to invest in the sector. In 2005, Kencall 
opened, followed by several other more formal BPo businesses: technobrain, 
Horizon, Adept and direct Channel-simba technologies, among others. 
these companies had workforces ranging from 100 to 500 workers and 
initially focused on getting big contracts from international clients (primarily 
Us and European firms). of the companies listed above, almost all reported 
In other words, while changing connectivities do appear to be facilitating a 
reduction of some regional differences in technical expertise, it does not appear 
to change the fact that developers need to understand their local markets in 
order to design appropriate applications and value chain models. one Rwandan 
developer noted: “It requires a lot of investment to come and establish 
something in the country. But for me, if I hold my laptop and an internet 
connection. I can build it while they are spending a lot of money.”  
In fact, many developers saw themselves as benefitting from the best of two 
worlds by being able to translate ideas and solutions proven elsewhere into 
local contexts. In many cases, developers have worked with single organisations 
like banks, government bodies or large companies to pilot a solution. these 
organisations provide much of the domain knowledge about how existing 
systems work and what challenges they are likely to face, and they also generate 
fairly predictable revenue for the ICt innovators. For example, there were two 
international e-health companies operating in Rwanda that took an existing 
system developed in a foreign context and applied it to a local context. In both 
cases, the companies employ nearly all Rwandan staff in their Rwandan offices 
and gave them in-depth training in how to use the system. In another case, a 
Rwandan developer was even able to export a large ICt system that he had 
built for a Rwandan large retail distributor. when he later travelled to Burundi 
and discovered a similar organisation in operation there, he was able to sell his 
solution to the new company, without making too many modifications.
However, the focus on local markets first also implies that ICt innovators 
grapple with local problems and market constraints. In particular, many 
participants expressed that ICt innovators are fundamentally constrained by 
the limited adoption of internet and mobile money by the wider population: 
making it difficult to monetise users’ ICt consumption.  
Motors for broader reputation and conceptual connectivity?
Another key intersection between BPo and ICt innovator value chains was the 
importance of projecting hope and optimism about the ICt sector overall. In 
this context, we found kLab, the government-created technology innovation hub 
in Kigali, to act as a highly visible showroom and convening point. Numerous 
journalists, foreign businesspeople and international organizations pass 
through the kLab: usually with the broad goal to get a sense of the ICt field 
in Rwanda. At the same time, ‘hanging out’ in the impressive, polished kLab 
space can easily give the impression that the Rwandan ICt sector is more 
developed than it is. 
the offline space (in combination with a polished web and social media 
presence) partly serves to generate co-learning and collaboration within 
Rwanda, but also focuses international attention and allows decision-makers 
to affect the image of the country’s ICt landscape abroad (irrespective of kLab’s 
immediate and actual effects on skill development). we would therefore argue 
that the organization serves a strategic role in attracting international attention 
and interest to Rwanda.
Policymakers and private sector associations have also emphasised developing 
a small number of well-qualified individuals who can demonstrate success and 
thereby attract international players to come to the country. CMU’s educational 
program is a case in point; it is designed for a very small number of top-notch 
developers and entrepreneurs. similarly, kLab can host only a limited number 
of developers and therefore needs to choose carefully amongst applicants. 
Meanwhile, respondents overwhelmingly felt that existing national universities 
are behind when it comes to ICt training. 
Finally, we can conclude, albeit tentatively, that the Rwandan government 
appears to understand many decision-making processes practiced by 
international companies. Rwanda has consistently scored well in rankings such 
as the world Bank’s ‘doing Business’ and the ItU’s internet speed ratings. 
their ability to provide security and a good image to visiting businesspeople has 
clearly impressed international companies. 
these observations resonate well with the idea of conceptual connectivity 
and its importance as a lever for local governments and media (Graham 
& Mann, 2013). At the end of the day, international (and certain local) 
actors’ perceptions of ICts and ICt innovations in Rwanda will shape their 
decisions—their mental concept of ICt and business in Rwanda becomes 
closer and more connected—and so the image that is projected ultimately 
can have real and material impacts.
ICT connectivity enhancers
Businesses in the sector of ICt connectivity enhancers in Rwanda also had 
value chains that were interconnected with those of the BPo sector. As ICt 
connectivity enhancement is ultimately about equipping users to extract more 
value from internet connectivity, this sector mostly had more indirect and long-
term ties with the BPo and ICt innovator sectors, adding to the broader ICt 
environment and actors’ (and workers’) technology savviness as well as their 
social connections with international actors.
In Rwanda, key examples of improvised, informal connectivity enhancer 
businesses were companies that exploited the limited penetration of 
international electronic payments, credit cards and postal addresses, as well 
as the limited technical expertise of the general population (for instance, 
some credit card-holding entrepreneurs acted as payment intermediaries 
between foreign equipment sellers and local clients). training programmes 
were another important part of connectivity enhancers; for instance, within 
the context of educational institutions like KIst and the oLPC initiative (oLPC, 
2013), or ICt entrepreneurship programmes like dot Rwanda and kLab.
Exploiting niches through built-up social connectivities
Many cases of companies in the connectivity enhancer category appear to be 
embedded in non-ICt-related import-oriented value chains (intermediation 
between global suppliers and local customers certainly plays an important 
role in this sector). Yet, many businesses in this category would not consider 
themselves to be intermediaries at the core. the term ‘enhancers’ implies 
something more: some added value. In many cases, Rwandan enablers also 
act as cultural enablers and enhancers of technology. For example, payment 
intermediaries are not merely acting as credit-card holders or the holders of 
superior knowledge or relationships, but also as individuals who understand 
two different cultures and act as brokers of understanding. 
Accordingly, as in other sectors, we found that access to faster internet did 
not necessarily allow businesses in the sector to establish new business 
relationships outside of Rwanda, but it allowed them to maintain and strengthen 
existing ones. Most businesses that had relationships with foreign companies 
had made these connections offline first, through mutual contacts and friends 
or conferences. some respondents had also studied or worked abroad. 
Another example of cultural brokerage is evident in website design. Rwandan 
website designers and developers have two distinct advantages in the Rwanda 
market: social knowledge and cultural knowledge. they had social networks 
that made them visible and trusted to Rwandan clients. they also understood 
the local culture and were better able to anticipate cultural sensibilities. 
Rwandan designers and developers therefore operated in two socio-cultural 
environments simultaneously, one global and one local; a finding similar to the 
one that takhteyev (2012) observed in the Brazilian software industry. 
workers in informal connectivity enhancers tended to be relatively mobile, 
and often made physical trips to markets in the Persian Gulf, Asia or other 
African countries. they established relationships with entrepreneurs in these 
locations while also building their own professional networks. In place of 
formal partnerships, informal connectivity enhancers relied on socialised trust, 
through visiting and maintaining contact with their suppliers. Better internet 
connectivity allowed them to maintain closer communication with partners and 
to acquire current information about markets and prices. 
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some focus group participants expressed a desire to have international 
employees or offices abroad in order to attract more work for their firm. For 
instance, one participant explicitly highlighted the importance of ‘presence’ 
in other markets, stressing ‘access to the end client’ as a key variable in 
determining the success of a business model. these participants also wanted 
the government to facilitate presence in foreign markets. the two drawings 
below again emphasize the importance of having ‘presence’:
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 the importance of physical proximity to customers in acquiring expertise 
and access to global networks of work was stressed by many interviewees. 
this is one of the primary reasons that impact-sourcing intermediaries like 
samasource and digital divide data have been so successful in sourcing 
work: they have offices in the United states and use these connections as the 
foundation of their business models. 
Kenyan companies also found it difficult to pull away business from India and 
other places. In many cases, Indian companies are instead passing on low-
value work to Kenyan contacts. Most Kenyan companies do not have enough 
capacity to attract a big client, while being unable to attract enough work to add 
enough seats to build this capacity in the first place.
some managers spoke of how Indian firms get around this problem by sharing 
work between delivery centres when they want to bid for a big contract. this 
strategy was also pursued by the organization Enablis in promoting rural 
BPo—their Indian advisors advised them to go for one big client, rather than 
a number of smaller ones. However, most existing Kenyan companies did not 
seem to have good enough relationships with their competitors to be able to 
coordinate in such a manner. the collapse of the former Kenyan BPo society 
has left the sector without a strong industry voice. A new society has been 
formed but it has had trouble establishing itself and gaining momentum.
In sum, it remains relatively rare for direct linkages to exist between 
international customers (i.e. firms in need of a service) and Kenyan BPo 
providers. Chains of intermediaries and consultants are typical, where big 
contracts are split and divided into smaller contracts distributed to multiple 
companies. 
Understanding BPO work
Kenyan companies and policy-makers also underestimated the difficulties of 
understanding which business processes BPo work at a distance would rely 
on, and they struggled to make sense of how the sector functions (Mann & 
Graham, 2013). Larger and more professional firms like Kencall and Horizon 
drew on Indian, Filipino and American consultants to help structure operations 
and train workforces. Impact BPos were likewise supported by international 
backers. As an example, Caroline wanjiku, the CEo of the impact-sourcing 
company daproim travelled to the Cambodian headquarters of digital 
divide data while workers from Impact sourcing Africa travelled to India to 
receive training from their Indian partner Ruralshores (sheth, 2013). smaller 
businesses that did not have this international support found their operations 
to be unprofitable. In particular, managers from smaller companies struggled 
to make sense of the variable costs and values of different forms of work and 
thereby judge their own capacities to meet deadlines and make profits. 
Because smaller Kenyan companies lacked adequate knowledge about the 
sector, many made errors of judgement. An interviewee who was considering 
bankruptcy explained how he and his colleagues had initially invested in a 
small operation of 15-20 people, hoping to get higher-value engineering 
work. However, they instead decided to partner with an Indian company that 
encouraged them to take on customer service work. As the relationship went 
on, the managers discovered that they could not make profits within the terms 
of the contract. the manager described his dilemma as such: 
[W]e approached a few people from Horizon and Techno Brain and they 
told us that [they] have 100 people at daytime and 100 people at night. 
Here we are trying eight people in daytime and four at night…We don’t 
have the scale… the lady who set this up, she went to India… and she saw 
thousands. It was like warehouses full of thousands... I thought: how are 
you going to compete? If you’ve got 20 seats and someone’s got 2,000 
seats, no matter what it is you’re doing, he’s going to do it much cheaper 
than you per seat…We knew how much it would cost, how much would the 
VoIP cost in America, were we going to go through America or going to go 
through India. We did that sort of research. And we knew what we needed 
to do to make it work. We couldn’t reach the threshold.
other Kenyan BPo operators faced similar problems of scale. In order 
to compete and get the kinds of clients they needed, they required larger 
workforces. But in order to acquire these larger workforces, they needed 
more consistent and profitable streams of work. they found themselves in a 
vicious cycle, compounded by their inexperienced management teams and the 
tendency for young BPo workers to move on to other jobs during slow periods. 
In turn, prospective clients looked at scalability and long-term capability when 
making the decision to come to Kenya.
Comprehending value was not an easily disintermediated process for 
either Kenyan managers or potential clients. difficulties in calculating the 
intangible value and the immaterial labour of BPo work made negotiating 
new contracts challenging and forced Kenyan actors to rely on existing BPo 
networks (steinmueller, 2002; Marazzi and Mecchia, 2007; spence and 
Carter, 2011). these networks were characterised both by altruistic wishes 
of foreign partners to help Kenyan partners and by more straightforward 
profit calculations. while some Kenyan managers believed that Indian and 
other foreign associates passed on work that Kenyan workers were better 
positioned to complete (due to their clearer English accents), others suspected 
collaborators were only passing on low-value contracts, while retaining higher-
value contracts.
Accordingly, many companies struggled to distinguish between profitable work 
and exploitative work. For example, one interviewee who had worked in three 
different Kenyan BPo companies complained: 
Some companies started a bit early, that were very influential and they 
had some very, very big clients. Now those clients left for various reasons, 
and when you have such kinds of huge clients leaving the country, to be 
quite honest, since 2008 when one of the biggest clients left Kenya, we 
have never seen anything bigger until today.
close to 100% international clients before 2009. As the sector began to 
grow, a Kenyan BPo and Contact Centre society was formed in 2007 and 
membership soon grew to more than thirty. An interviewee who had also 
worked as an advisor to Indian and Chinese BPo destinations, summarised 
Kenya’s advantage as follows: 
The good thing about call centre [work] is the [Kenyan] accents are 
very, very good and neutral. Number two is there are some amount 
of saturation levels reaching India and Philippines, and number three 
is attrition levels in these countries and companies operating in these 
companies are crazy high. I think the attrition levels [has reached] about 
100 percent … in India and Philippines. So I think the customers are …
saying ‘I need… a new source’ 
Many managers and policymakers thus positioned the country as a BPo 
customer service hub. In 2008, Kencall won the award ‘Best Non-European 
Call Centre’ at the Call Centre Focus Conference, the biggest trade show in the 
industry. this effectively began to put Kenya on the outsourcing map.
Thwarted prospects in the wake of the arrival of fibre-optic cables
Unfortunately, this optimism proved short-lived. By the end of 2008, many BPo 
companies were experiencing difficulties. Companies like Global Connection 
and Continental had closed, and even the largest firms were struggling (Kundu, 
2008). Internet prices had not dropped as much as hoped, and firms found 
themselves struggling to work cost-effectively. 
the global recession did its part and made international firms less likely 
to engage with unknown African firms (omondi, 2012). Exacerbating this 
perception of financial risk was a significant public relations risk attached 
to BPo. Us President Barack obama identified the offshoring of jobs as a 
key issue in his 2008 and 2012 election campaigns. In 2008, he repeatedly 
declared the Us needed to “stop giving tax breaks to companies that ship jobs 
overseas” (thibodeau, 2012). In 2012, he sarcastically labelled his challenger, 
Mitt Romney, a “pioneer in outsourcing” (dwyer, 2012). while the true impact of 
the recession on outsourcing is mixed (on the one hand, recession encourages 
firms to cut costs, but on the other hand, it pressures politicians to erect 
protectionist policies),17 many Kenyan managers cited obama’s speeches as 
having seriously affected their business. 
one reason that this situation might have particularly hurt Kenya (as compared 
to other destinations like India and the Philippines) was the fact that Kenya 
would have needed vocal support from the first international clients in order 
to establish itself (during the BPo sector’s critical growth phase). By making 
it difficult for clients to openly endorse a new destination, the global recession 
may have dried up opportunities for new outsourcing destinations while 
maintaining a steady (but less visible) flow to already established countries. In 
other words, the global political and economic contexts at the time of the arrival 
of fibre-optic cables in 2009 did not afford much visibility to Kenyan firms.  
Reorientation towards impact and domestic outsourcing 
As a result, after 2009, many Kenyan BPo firms went out of business, and 
others actually managed outflows of BPo work, as in the Rwandan case. one 
BPo consultant commented:
I think some companies here who are outsourcing their work to India 
for example. So they don’t even have to make big noise about it because 
it’s not socially accepted…it’s not a nice way…of doing business because 
they feel the jobs are going out. But you can ask those companies they’re 
probably growing faster because of that.18
Yet others have turned to ‘impact-sourcing’,19 attempting to position Kenya as a 
host to corporate social responsibility schemes. the impact sourcing company 
digital divide data opened an office in Kenya, and samasource began to find 
partners to whom it could pass work from its Us offices. Even amongst some of 
the more established interviewees, many had come to depend on samasource 
for overseas work. the Rockefeller Foundation and Enablis (a foundation that 
promotes entrepreneurship in low-income countries) also partnered to open a 
rural impact sourcing BPo project in the city of Kisumu. However, interviewees 
reported that the margins tend to be lower than they are from other pathways 
when work comes through such an intermediary.  
the Kenyan government’s approach began to shift noticeably. the Kenya ICt 
Board started to allocate funds to Konza City instead directly to BPo promotion, 
and the government adjusted its communication efforts to distance itself from 
a focus on the BPo sector, for instance often using terms such as ‘ItEs’ (It 
enabled services) and ‘software development’ instead of ‘BPo’. 
Yet, the most striking development concerning BPo in Kenya was a clear 
shift towards the local market. Most of the interviewed firms that had 
mainly attracted international inflows of work in 2008 were now dependent 
on domestic workflows. some smaller companies had a higher share of 
international inflows of work, but this was more piecemeal and usually focused 
on lower-value impact sourcing. In only a few years, some firms had gone from 
having close to 100% of their clients being non-local to international clients now 
making up only 20-40% of their business. 
overall, we found the Kenyan BPo companies that have survived to be rather 
mature, business savvy and battle-hardened. Nevertheless, signs of exhaustion 
and a new inward-focus were dominant. these companies employ anywhere 
from 20 to 300 workers. there have been reports of late payments to workers, 
and the financial sustainability of many of the businesses is still not ensured. 
Many of them say that it is a learning process and that they are now ready for 
the global market.
Major challenges
Given that Kenya is an important case where high-flying expectations towards 
the BPo sector did not match the complex realities of remaining barriers for 
businesses, the remainder of this section focuses on an outline of challenges 
that the sector has had to grapple with. Particular emphasis is placed on 
problems of intermediation, as this was an important concern for many of our 
participants.
Direct access to clients
First, Kenyan companies underestimated how difficult it would be to access 
international work opportunities. while physical internet connections are often 
presented as the key that allows countries to engage in international service 
work, interviewees stressed the difficulty in actually communicating directly 
with clients. this was starkly demonstrated in the following diagram made by a 
participant in a focus group (in response to a prompt to draw current and ideal 
flows of work):
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the BPo manager who made the diagram distinguished between an 
‘international associate’ (presumably a consultant or intermediary) and an 
‘international client’ (an organisation in need of the provided BPo service). 
without direct contact with international clients, the manager felt unable to 
provide full-time stable employment to his workers. this ultimately created a 







successful examples among the Kenyan sample, but in many cases, the 
most successful applications were not produced and marketed by developers 
alone, but rather by people with a deep knowledge of the targeted market 
who drove production and distribution, relying on a developer co-founder for 
the technical part.
one example is an e-agricultural application developed by a farmer in 
collaboration with a developer. the farmer in question had been involved in 
a foundation that provided information to farmers about organic farming. In 
2005, she realized that “it became really, really apparent that [they] didn’t have 
very much of the strength and service on the ground in delivering information 
knowledge to farmers” partly due to the structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s that had cut back government extension services. so she decided to use 
mobile phones to spread the organisation’s information into rural areas. she 
was advised by one of the iHub founders to get “a good developer and a good 
lawyer”. she had no experience of the developer community and explained 
that she had to “become very street smart in the space that [she] knew nothing 
[about]”. she felt there was a disconnect between the people who know about 
technology and the people who most need technology, explaining 
We need to stop assuming that it can only be done by the techies and we 
need to start letting the rest of the world know that they can do this. 
this was a common comment from the interviewees, especially from 
representatives of technology innovation hubs and business incubators 
like kLab, m:lab and iHub: developers were seen to need a broader set of 
interactions in the wider economy in order to understand how economic and 
information systems can best intersect in everyday life. 
For instance, one developer had struggled to launch a food delivery service. 
this was largely because whilst he and his team had the expertise to create 
the digital tools for the service (i.e. the tools to become an intermediary), they 
didn’t have any of the requisite skills or experience to be an intermediary. He 
noted: “what happened more and more…I stopped being a software company, I 
became a…logistics company that provided a little software on the side”. 
Expanding one step at a time
In terms of expansion strategies, most Kenyan developers are focused on the 
Kenyan and wider African market, and are apprehensive about expanding 
further. A large Kenya-based development company was planning to expand 
into “five countries in two years and 20 countries [after] another five years” 
but this expansion was “all in Africa”. when asked if the company ever got 
contacted by people in other regions outside of Africa, the manager replied, 
All the time. All the time. South East Asia,…South Americans, a lot of the 
emerging markets, very similar problems to what we have here. The only 
challenge is that we absolutely have no capacity to go out there. I think we 
have so much fish to fry here [b]efore we can start looking at elsewhere. 
But… if we get a really good deal… That means that we can widely go on 
our software and give it to a reseller say in Brazil, we can consider it. But I 
think we said look, at least for the next three years let’s, let’s concentrate 
on our Africa plan.
this sentiment was evident in another company that specialised in agricultural 
applications. this company had been contacted by potential clients in Uganda, 
Rwanda, Ethiopia and sierra Leone, but when the manager was asked what 
prevented her company from moving into new countries, she replied:
At the moment we are just busy doing what we are doing, staying where 
we are and getting our model right here. So there is lots of work still to 
be done. We are very young; we are a year old, just 15 months old from 
the time we went to market … A lot of our learning [involves] dealing with 
farms on the ground because in some areas now, we have said okay we, 
we’ve fixed that. Now how do we scale what are we going to do? [After 
that,] we are ready to cut and paste the model. It should work in other 
countries. 
she explained that the company’s scaling strategy was ultimately about 
developing and perfecting its outreach in Kenya, explaining that “having a 
bigger team doesn’t mean you are going to reach out to more farmers”. she 
felt that the Kenyan market was big enough, estimating that 80% of Kenya’s 40 
million people were engaged in agriculture. the size of the local market meant 
that the company wanted to improve its services and involve more farmers from 
different sub-sectors before it moved into other countries.
these kinds of responses (i.e. that African and Kenyan markets are big enough 
and a more appropriate challenge for young Kenyan startups) were common 
throughout the ICt innovator sample. developers were most interested in 
exercising their competitive advantage of intimate knowledge about a market or 
on speed and nimbleness over incumbents and large firms. one developer of 
accountancy software aimed at the sME market commented: 
Yes, we’re very worried those [larger financial software companies] are 
actually our main competitors…So we’re trying to bank on the first mover 
benefit and try and push what we have, as fastest and as furthest as we 
can. So by the time the big companies land here, we already have our own 
markets... 
The advantage we have over them is that we understand the way the 
businesses in Kenya here are run best, and we’ve developed a solution 
that’s actually focussing on them, not something they’re trying to adapt to.
ICT connectivity enhancers
Kenya has been home to a large ICt sector for longer than Rwanda. the 
sector is therefore characterised by significantly different value chains of ICt 
connectivity enhancers. Notable examples in the Kenyan sample were It 
systems providers and various international It and ICt companies that set up 
an office in Kenya to improve their local presence.
sector evolution and skills upgrading
Many interviewees described the way the sector has evolved over time. For 
instance, the manager of a network hardware company noted:
I remember just when ISPs had just started coming into the market. We 
had very few ISPs, and then [at some point] there was an explosion of 
ISPs…There was a lot of demand for networking, so we just first started 
with that product line: basically as a networking organization. Then of 
course after two, three years there was a shift in the industry whereby 
people wanted more than just a network. You know, they wanted a proper 
data centre; so we now started going into high end computing in terms of 
partnerships. 
Initially we had partnerships with Cisco. We now had to go partner with 
Oracle, and those days there was also SUN Micro systems…What that the 
company has done, is evolved with the way the global industry has evolved. 
At the time we started, networking was the in-thing, then it went to high 
end computing and then right now the big buzz words is in things like ‘big 
data’; in things like analytics. Trying to do the very high-end kind of apps. 
We’ve realised that our biggest highest value will be in apps, right? So 
we’ve started building a very big practise within the apps space.
Another company (a software solutions provider) echoed this kind of 
transformation:
We started off in 1999 to 2000 as a website development company and 
that’s what we were doing, basically websites. I think at the time, that 
was the hottest thing. Internet had just landed in Kenya. People were 
starting to get excited about it, companies wanted to start getting involved 
and being aware and that kind of thing so it was a niche for us. But what 
quickly happened is that more and more people started doing websites so 
we moved on to the next thing. Right about the time when we were moving 
on—that’s 2003, 2004—mobile was just landing in Kenya in terms of mass 
adoption so you had more and more people with mobile devices. They got 
smarter, cheaper, and what that meant is that we could play around with 
different things. And as the years went on, we realized we’re very good at 
automating supply chains. So that’s what we concentrated on, and we got 
this problem was ostensibly magnified by a world Bank subsidy, which 
encouraged inexperienced firms to enter the market. In 2009, responding to 
criticisms about the world Bank subsidy, the new CEo of the ICt Board, Paul 
Kukubo, explained in an interview with Kenya’s Ratio Magazine:
A lot of the people who came in to ask for the bandwidth subsidy were 
new businesses… Their problem wasn’t bandwidth costs, but a basic 
lack of capacity and understanding of the industry itself. Many small 
and inexperienced firms have cropped up in response to government 
incentives, which established BPO companies say is dragging down the 
industry’s reputation (Ratio Magazine, 2009)
Viewed through a national lens, the closure of several firms made the whole 
sector seem immature and risky. the good faith that had been extended in 
2008, when the Kenyan marketing campaign was in full swing, had faded by 
2012 and 2013, and larger Kenyan BPos found themselves on the back foot. 
they had to find a way to restore the faith of international clients, who needed 
assurances that Kenyan companies were capable of taking on international 
contracts. 
Moving beyond domestic BPO? How?
domestic outsourcing became a way for Kenyan managers to make sense of 
the industry and to prove their value to clients within a local setting. It would 
also allow them to experiment with higher value BPo through automation 
and digitisation projects in Kenya and the wider East African context. this 
re-orientation was supported by key government officials in the ICt Board and 
the Ministry of Information who saw local outsourcing as a way of increasing 
efficiency and making the economy more competitive. In september 2013, 
Ratio Magazine quoted the Kenyan Permanent secretary of Information and 
Communication, Bitange Ndemo, explaining the government’s shift:
Mid-stream we changed policy and indeed communicated that we had 
shifted from marketing Kenya abroad to local outsourcing. (…) It was 
pointless to continue marketing Kenya abroad when we had sufficient 
work locally. (…) Once we became proficient and realized internal 
efficiencies, then we could now move to the outside world. We still have 
the opportunity to use this strategy (Ratio Magazine, 2013).
domestic outsourcing would allow Kenyan managers to retain their workers, 
build up competencies and expand their portfolio of clients. It was not just a 
matter of turning to domestic clients in the absence of international clients, but 
rather it was also an attempt to use the domestic market as a way of building 
global recognition in the long run. For this reason, almost all our interviewees 
claimed that they wanted Indian and other foreign BPo operators to enter the 
country. the manager of a large, well-established Kenyan BPo asserted:
The government could help these companies to get business through a 
secondary effect such as promoting Indians and others to come to Kenya, 
therefore it looks like Kenya’s attractive, therefore people who don’t 
want those guys may now pick the Kenyans and the Kenyans get more 
business.
Another interviewee reinforced this belief, asserting that Indian companies 
would bring work to Kenya from existing clients:
The good thing about Spancos and Tech Mahindras [Indian BPO 
companies] of the world is they have the financial muscle, but more than 
that they have the global leverage. So they have… various customers from 
India, from China…. when they… say “now we have a centre in Kenya as 
well” … a big, large company, … fortune 100, fortune 500, might come and 
say, “Fine I’d like to try it out in Kenya.” 
Managers saw the entrance of foreign companies normalizing Kenya’s 
reputation. Indian and other foreign BPo companies would bring prominent 
clients and provide Kenyan workers and managers with experience and 
understanding of the systems and processes required. Most importantly, 
foreign BPo operators would show foreign investors that Kenya was a 
stable, reliable destination. this desire was manifested in our interviews 
with representatives from the Kenya ICt Board, who revealed that a 
newer government strategy was to now focus efforts on attracting large 
international financial and BPo companies into the country in order to again 
jump-start the sector. 
ICT innovators
As in Rwanda, value chains in the Kenyan BPo sector were closely related to the 
value chains in the country’s ICt innovation sector. Given both sectors’ longer 
history in Kenya, these interconnections are also marked by a greater degree of 
complexity. the most important interconnections were found in the movement 
of skilled labour between sectors, as well as in the realm of the country’s overall 
reputation as a destination for ICts. In the Kenyan context, there is the additional 
element of a shift in emphasis by the government and media from a specific 
focus on BPo until about 2010 to the ICt innovation landscape thereafter. the 
iHub represents a particularly notable piece of the puzzle, in that it played a 
large role in crafting an image of Kenya as the ‘silicon savannah’, emphasizing 
grassroots, private sector-driven ICt entrepreneurship.
the role of M-Pesa
the success of M-Pesa and the growth of a smart phone-owning middle class 
have undoubtedly attracted foreign developers and ICt companies to Kenya. 
Much of this attraction is based around a brand that the country has created 
for itself as a ‘silicon savannah’. one Us-American developer working in Kenya 
described how he had decided to move to Kenya:
We came following M-Pesa. We came because the market was ready 
here. The market indicators were good… the growing middle class is 
relatively stable, [and there are low] political and currency risks. 
M-Pesa came up in many other interviews with Kenyan developers describing 
how it had opened up doors of opportunity. one interviewee described how a 
south African company had contacted his company for a particularly interesting 
project. He did not immediately understand why they had contacted him. He 
explained:
[W]hat they planned to do was really big and ambitious and fun and 
interesting, we really wanted in but we couldn’t quite figure out why we 
were are in it, and then it turned out that the people [at] the heart of this 
project, kind of had this perception that Kenyans understand mobile 
payments like at a genetic level, it’s like we can run and we know how to 
make mobile payments working and that’s why M-Pesa’s uptake has had 
and all these things. So there was a sense people think we had a secret 
sauce of some kind, and we didn’t have secret sauce but we did have a 
certain amount of examples we could extrapolate from.
Another developer that had done numerous coding projects for foreign 
development companies in the Us and UK (as well as launching its own 
applications) described M-Pesa as a black swan that “can’t be repeated; it’s 
just there”. But while he felt there was a little too much hype, he maintained 
that the perception that “Kenya is very way ahead” is “good because it gives you 
a job at the end of the day”. He also asserted that Kenya was cost-competitive 
and had pools of talent and experience with regards to sMs-based applications, 
relative to other regions. 
Combining market knowledge with technical skills to address local markets
As in Rwanda, the most successful companies are those that had upgraded an 
existing ICt system for a large incumbent firm or government agencies. this 
model of software and It system development tended to offer a secure revenue 
stream and had low risks, but again larger and more established companies 
had advantages in gaining access and the trust of government bodies and 
larger companies.
Younger developers and start-ups were more likely to try to build their own 
mobile applications, often aimed at the mass market. there were some very 
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7. discussion
these findings have shown that the story about the impact of internet 
connectivity on Kenya and Rwanda’s BPo sectors is not a simple one. 
the idea of an ICt revolution that would generate widespread economic 
growth after the arrival of the fibre-optic cables did not materialize evenly 
and across the board. In the BPo sector, changing connectivity has not 
radically changed the roles that East Africa’s geography and social relations 
within East Africa play. Both the Rwandan and the Kenyan BPo sectors 
ended up focusing largely on domestic and regional deals instead of clients 
from outside of Africa. we also saw that BPo sectors are intertwined with, 
and rely on, other sectors of connectivity-based enterprises, namely ICt 
innovators and ICt connectivity enhancers.
this chapter serves to examine and summarise why the sectors have evolved 
the way they did. we discuss our findings and carefully generalise across the 
particular contexts of Kenya and Rwanda. we iteratively examine the unique 
characteristics of the three sectors of connectivity-based enterprises before 
discussing commonalities.
Unique characteristics of connectivity-based 
enterprise sectors
BPO sectors
diverse but persistent (re-)intermediation
the BPo sector, more than the other examined sectors, was characterised 
by powerful mechanisms of intermediation and an array of hierarchical value 
chain structures. Even though the region had overcome some infrastructural 
barriers through improved internet connectivity, other barriers remained 
between BPo clients and providers. 
distributed work platforms like odesk and elance are often cited as evidence 
that the international economy is entering a flatter, more disintermediated 
era. such hopes are partly misplaced. Internet connectivity is undoubtedly an 
enabler, but is not a sufficient solution to the difficulties that East African BPo 
operators face in engaging with clients over distance. Although individuals 
and smaller companies gain access to inflows of international BPo work from 
distributed work platforms, they usually only offer short-term, piecemeal 
work; which is hardly the kind of work that can sustain a formalized local BPo 
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figure 4: bpo chains
Figure 4 illustrates that there are numerous ways that East African BPo 
companies can try to access work. First, a company can try to access work from 
domestic clients, using its social connections and its sales staff to physically 
visit premises and conduct pitches. second, the East African BPo company 
can gain access to international inflows of work from either an international 
client company or an intermediary international consultant. third, an East 
African BPo company can gain access to international inflow of work from 
distributed work platforms. Fourth, the East African BPo company can gain 
access to BPo work from impact-sourcing intermediaries like samasource 
or become a local partner for an impact-sourcing company like digital divide 
data. Fifth, governmental organisations like the RdB and the Kenyan ICt Board 
in collaboration with agencies of foreign governments can intermediate and 
broker work opportunities on behalf of East African BPo companies. 
these observations support the idea of ‘re-intermediation’. distributed work 
platforms, by virtue of their design principles, offered only certain kinds of 
barely-profitable and non-sustainable work in a ‘take it or leave it’ format. 
Better connectivity also allowed international consultants and more powerful 
companies to re-package and re-distribute work to Kenyan and Rwandan 
companies that are lower down in the chain.
Underestimated market forces of global BPo value chains
Policymakers, popular discourse, and BPo managers themselves originally 
underestimated the complexities of value creation and extraction in the BPo 
sector. they followed a belief in the (at face value enticing) vision of BPo as a 
simple and ICt-mediated redistribution of work from rich countries to places 
with labour cost advantages. Fittingly, a workshop participant in Rwanda 
described the beginnings of the BPo sector as a “gold rush”, outlining how an 
in-depth understanding of the complexity of the market and industry has only 
started to slowly evolve in the recent past.
In reality, international inflows of work from outside of Africa were the exception 
in Rwanda and Kenya. More necessary conditions than just internet connectivity 
(such as social connections between clients and suppliers, service quality, 
higher skill levels, and scale efficiencies) would have to be met before local BPo 
industries would experience a boost from workflows arriving from international 
clients. In both Rwanda and Kenya, BPo operators were stuck at a limited 
capacity (quality and available scale) that did not allow them to work efficiently: 
which in turn would have been necessary to expand and/or attract better skilled 
workers.
For example, in software development, the wage per worker would often 
be lower in Rwanda compared to India, but Rwandan BPo businesses were 
still not able to effectively compete with Indian businesses because they 
lacked the capacity to take on larger and more complicated projects. kLab 
representatives mentioned that they received 7-10 software development 
outsourcing requests per month from companies outside of Rwanda, but could 
usually not find suitable BPo suppliers for this expressed demand. At times, 
local BPo companies themselves “re-outsource” their work abroad, hiring 
foreign companies, as this can still be cheaper than doing it locally for large 
scale projects. Accordingly, our interviewees spoke of many more constraints 
than internet connectivity; for instance, their labour costs, middle management 
skills, and (global) marketing strategies. 
the downside of the internet’s ‘flattening’ impact on the global BPo sector 
was also apparent: profitable BPo work had already been commoditized, 
and without differentiation and an a priori trust-deficit, Kenyan and Rwandan 
businesses could not compete with Indian and other Asian BPo suppliers. 
Instead, only very low-value work sometimes got passed on from India, which 
did not support the countries’ competitiveness in global markets. 
Finally, we found evidence of marked differences in subsectors of BPo that 
had not originally been apparent to policymakers and managers. For example, 
both data entry and software development businesses in Rwanda spoke of skill 
rewarded much later because we started being known for mobile supply 
chain automation. In agriculture and in retail. And now most recently in 
research. 
this ever-changing, demanding landscape helped establish the careers of 
young Kenyan developers and technologists. As in Rwanda, informal It supply 
and basic website design proved to be a gateway for young entrepreneurs to 
transition into more valuable and high-skilled positions, as they found their 
own niches within the market. the two quotes above represent companies 
that started in a largely informal, student-run capacity and are now among the 
largest It companies in Kenya, combining both ICt connectivity-enhancing and 
innovation value chains.
developers similarly used evolutions in the ICt sector to upgrade their 
own skills, even if they did not build large ICt businesses. At times, basic 
connectivity enhancement work (such as website design) provided an 
opportunity to hone skills and gain familiarity with business models and 
practices in ICt. the manager of an e-commerce facilitator noted:
[B]etween 2002 to about 2004, even though there was all this connectivity 
increasing, what was happening is that it wasn’t exactly translating directly 
into business yet…I think from 2000 to about 2003, I was doing roughly 
four, five websites … on a monthly basis. Either on my own or working for 
someone. And a lot of these sites were basically just basic sites now…
Now the problem is that you’ve build brochure websites for two, three 
years. You kind of stagnated, … you’re not really growing on a web agency 
anymore, you’re not becoming a senior creative or whatever, you’re just a 
junior creative. I ended up being a PHP developer for close to ten, nine, ten 
years… I actually dropped things like C++ to move into PHP development 
was because of this whole centralized access thing…It became clearer 
that this is something that you can do a whole lot more.
International companies as bridge builders for local firms
Kenya’s rapid uptake of ICts has also attracted international It companies into 
the country. these international firms now have fairly well established regional 
businesses, usually based in Nairobi and have skilled workforces spread across 
many different countries, thus allowing them to enjoy economies of scale.
Importantly, these international businesses operate using tiers of knowledge 
and solution-finding. If a problem cannot be solved in a satellite office, it is 
forwarded to the African headquarters in Kenya. If the Kenyan office cannot 
solve it, then it’s forwarded to a foreign office or partner’s office, typically in 
India (we spoke to five firms that operate a model similar to this one). one 
Kenyan company, established by an Indian manager, estimated that 75% of his 
technical expertise was located in India, but that Kenya had strong capacities 
both in mobile payments and in local content development. Another manager 
estimated that building content in Kenya cost him “15 times more” than getting 
it done in India. In other words, these companies are increasingly operating and 
thinking at the multinational level. such examples are reminiscent of Moriset 
and Malecki’s arguments that large ICt-based businesses can exploit both 
agglomeration and dispersion economies, depending on task requirements 
and the locus and transferability of knowledge (Malecki & Moriset, 2007; 
Moriset & Malecki, 2009). 
Yet, as in the Rwandan case, the presence of international companies often 
functioned as a bridge builder for local companies to access foreign clients. 
one interviewee explained how her suppliers sourced work for her company:
the customer came to us through…an international supplier…And once we 
have done a good job, that means the customer keeps coming back to you. 
Another example of a Kenyan partnership with a European company emerged 
in the context of the global recession, which created opportunities for this 
particular Kenyan company. the manager told us: 
What we did initially when we did the [Kenyan] project, we worked with a 
Portuguese company… When the depression came to Europe around one, 
two years ago, some of those guys unfortunately lost their jobs. Since we 
had good relationships with them, we were able to form a company… So I 
am sure when we will be having this interview in another one year I will be 
telling you we have to get these three four five customers. 
Finally, a manager of a Kenyan-based software testing company described 
how his company hoped to get international contracts through working with 
international companies doing projects in Kenya. He explained that all of his 
customers are in Kenya: 
…because we are moving into other areas, into the other countries where 
these companies are… Like, for example where I am, they have branches 
all over: even in South America, even in India, even in Europe. So we are 
able to move out to where they are. 
…you need to cut a niche in the market, and you can only do that by 
partnering, doing business with multinational companies. 
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that external client. So it’s not that technology is lacking, but it is not the 
solution, it is only an enabler.
ICT innovator sector
Enterprise-centric value networks
to discuss the ICt innovator sector, it is useful to distinguish between 
those businesses that implement ICt systems in existing companies (see 
‘upgrading existing systems’ in Figure 5), such as digitising processes and 
building information infrastructures, and those companies that created new 
applications and software from scratch for the consumer market (‘creation of 
new systems’ in the figure below). the figure below depicts the stylised value 
chains of these two types of businesses.
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figure 5: ict innovator chains
As indicated above, East African ICt innovators accrue value jointly from their 
technical abilities and by applying those abilities to sell solutions in a local 
context. technical expertise can be gained from open source communities, 
educational programs and experience in other organisations. Using this 
technical expertise, the developer can then either create a new system for the 
mass market (on the left of the diagram) or upgrade an existing system (on the 
right of the diagram). the ability of the innovator to develop an application or 
platform of a newly identified market depends on their understanding of the 
user, their ability to understand the market and pricing model and their plan 
for scaling. the ability of an innovator to upgrade an existing system depends 
more on tendering requirements and also on social relationships with the 
organisation in question. the potential to expand into new markets is further 
dependent on whether conditions and market structures in the new market 
resemble those of the existing market. 
there are also differences in the value chain of foreign ICt innovators present 
in Kenya and Rwanda. they are more likely to be connected to, or embedded 
in, existing transnational social networks and have more experience selling 
to clients in their home markets. Because they recognize the difficulties of 
developing from afar, they establish a physical presence in East Africa in 
order to benefit from familiarity with the local markets. this combination 
and configuration of connections, skills and resources gives such companies 
distinct advantages for tendering. despite a context of changing connectivity, 
and a theoretical ability to carry out non-proximate work, we therefore still 
witness a need for these firms to have a strong local footprint. 
In sum, we see a less hierarchical array of value chains. ICt innovators are 
usually at the centre of a value network, rather than at the bottom of a value 
chain. they decide to develop an application or software that is new to a market, 
and thus appear to have greater influence over the conditions under which they 
operate. 
Focus on ‘local’ from the start
this was mirrored in the growth and expansion strategies of ICt innovators, 
which, though ambitious, relied more on the decisions of business people and 
entrepreneurs as they reacted to immediately perceived market opportunities. 
this was contrasted with the BPo sector, where (at least initially) government 
interventions (including specific targets in Kenya’s case) had set a vision and a 
course for the sector as a whole. ICt innovators also drew more substantially 
on technology innovation hubs such as kLab and the iHub to organise 
themselves by establishing grassroots communities that are not immediately 
driven by high-level policy.
the entrepreneurial approach implied a stronger and more immediate focus 
on differentiation and customer needs. From the beginning, this sector 
emphasised ‘the local’ where actors knew they would have competitive 
advantages over international actors. It appeared as if the ICt innovator sector 
had in part learned from failures in the BPo and other sectors. 
For the gifted ones, a (new) sense of opportunity
Many entrepreneurs and software developers in the ICt innovator group felt 
that they were able to combine the best of both worlds (i.e. combine knowledge 
from a global world of software and entrepreneurial skills with unique local 
knowledge about subject-matter domains or traditional economic sectors), 
which international companies could not replicate. kLab, iHub and other 
technology innovation hubs again played an important role, since they provided 
bandwidth that allowed developers and entrepreneurs to access knowledge and 
resources available online (in particular, open source software); interviewees in 
the iHub and kLab often mentioned online learning resources like Udacity and 
stack overflow, in addition to the use of Google as “an academy”.
But hubs also provided networking opportunities that would allow ICt 
innovators to initiate real projects (sometimes formed as start-ups) during 
which they could apply and test their knowledge, and to find out who and what 
matters. one of the managers of iHub described the learning process of one 
user of the facility:
They’re driven by passion and the need to learn and keep on learning. 
Some of them have never…gone to university; they are actually self-
taught…A veteran developer in Kenya [is] very well known, but you will 
never know [it] unless you sit down with him. And he keeps on telling 
me “you know we’re connected with the world globally” and he says “as 
long as the internet is there, you can teach yourself a new skill every 
single day. You have so many resources at your disposal and now internet 
connectivity is not a barrier.” I mean, you open any site and any academic 
site, you’ll get books, you’ll get resources which you can read and you can 
put yourself at par to anyone globally”…So in 2010, [he] taught himself 
android after he downloaded a [learning application] that came out around 
2008, ’09 and was very fresh. He taught himself programming and he’s 
very good on the Windows platform. It just took him six months to actually 
download these sources from the internet,… sit at the iHub and he already 
had a network. And when people heard [he] was very good at android, 
Oh my gosh everyone wanted him, like because he’s good and we have 
developers like that.
gaps, but when probed further, the typical constraints in recruitment differed: 
applicants for data entry jobs often lacked ICt usage skills as well as time 
management competence, while software developers were missing a good 
understanding of customer needs and the context of outsourcing projects that 
they worked on.
Gaps in workers’ skills on multiple levels hamper competitiveness
Multiple dimensions of human capital proved to be key assets for BPo 
companies, even for those that targeted what is usually considered “low-
skilled” outsourcing work. Mostly technical skills were concerned, but we 
also found soft skills, attitudes and work ethic to be important. For instance, 
Rwandan data entry workers were described as diligent and reliable, motivated 
by the common cause to rebuild the country, but at the same time they were 
seen to lack time and task management competence. 
Higher education institutions were found to be unable to fill these gaps 
comprehensively. the knowledge that they instil was often described as 
“theoretical”, that is, not applicable or relevant in the marketplace. Participants 
also described that employees often displayed a mind-set of lacking vision and 
ambition, resulting in lower performance.
this implied that BPo providers had to train their employees themselves, 
offering courses in-house. In turn, this meant that they would have to make 
significant investments and build training competencies that were not part 
of their core business. For example, one participant explained that offering 
trainings would ultimately increase the seat price that he could offer. overall, 
BPo businesses struggled to understand and adjust to the multi-faceted skill 
gaps of workers, limiting their opportunities for value creation and extraction. 
Challenges of late-followers: learning and building trust takes time
In both countries, many in the sector went through a learning curve about the 
potentials and limitations of BPo work. the main learning outcome was that 
internet connectivity does not eliminate the need for direct, trusted interactions 
with clients and an understanding of their needs. Both continue to be easier 
to achieve in markets close to the BPo operator’s own location or when 
temporary physical proximity (torre, 2008) can be established. for example 
during shorter visits of international clients. It appeared no longer possible for 
Kenya or Rwanda to achieve the overwhelming scale efficiencies of Indian and 
Asian operators. In contrast, as early movers, India and Asian countries had a 
unique opportunity to service clients from all over the world and establish their 
reputation and (national) brand over time.
Accordingly, we found that seasoned operators in the BPo sector held savvy 
and level-headed conceptions about how changing connectivity is likely to alter 
the nature of geographical distance and social intermediation. they regularly 
encountered the challenges of accessing international work and knew that 
face-to-face contact and clients’ favourable perceptions usually need to go 
hand-in-hand with internet connectivity in the BPo sector. one manager 
described why gaining access to domestic work was easier:
It’s easier to do those deals because it’s face-to-face; this is what I do, this 
is what my quality assurance manager is saying; it’s more personal; it’s 
more tangible 
dealings between foreign clients and East African companies need similar 
face-to-face contact and reassurance. For example, the Kenyan manager of an 
impact-sourcing BPo explained that there are still geographical barriers in the 
way clients perceived destinations like Kenya. she highlighted:
People don’t know where Kenya is. They don’t know where it is in the map. 
They don’t know what it is. And so they, they send all these things about 
terrorism. The Philippines, where they [clients] are happy to send all their 
stuff, has been in insurgency for 30 years. But that doesn’t bother them 
because they know that Philippine companies are successfully providing 
services to their neighbours down the street. But [about] our people, they 
have no idea. And anything they might have heard is negative. So, you 
know, we’re used to that. 
she added that: 
The largest clients that we’ve gotten from the US market have physically 
come here. And I mean one thing is you know they know that we actually 
exist, but they want to view the staff they want to see the facility that, you 
know, to be investment for them, to try a new country.
while managers throughout the sector expressed similar sentiments about the 
persistence of geographical barriers, they were still hopeful that such distance 
could be surmounted over time, through physical visits and social networking. 
the manager of a large BPo operator commented:
People who have outsourced or been in the outsourcing field for 20 years 
when they see a country like Kenya they can see it because they’ve seen 
it happening, they’ve seen it happen in the Philippines, they’ve seen it 
happen in South Africa, and they can feel that. So again, partnerships 
work. That’s the best way to sort some of these things, because it’s hard 
for you to walk into a New York office of somebody and tell them you 
want them to send their work to Kenya. They’re going to throw you out of 
the door. But if somebody puts you in contact and they can vouch for you 
it becomes an easier sell; now it’s about a competitive amount.  
Interviewer: So the world is flat when you have relationships? 
Interviewee: (Laughing) Pretty much. I mean that’s how life works, yeah? 
If you think about it, think about politics and elections in the US, scratch 
my back, I scratch your back, yeah? Campaign for me, I’ll make you an 
ambassador somewhere. Same thing here. I mean businesses across the 
world: it’s people getting to know one another somewhere. Let’s assume 
it’s level: I advertise my company; you have an interest in my services: 
then it’s about how confident do you feel about us offering those services? 
So at the end of the day if you’re not competitive, it doesn’t matter who 
you know, but if you’re competitive, however you get your channel of 
marketing to relationships whether it’s through PR, whether it’s through 
any other normal channel is then how convincing can you be about the 
capability of your services. Once you get them through the door, how well 
can you deliver that service, that’s what keeps people here.
this need for personal and proximate intermediation is also evident in 
Rwanda’s more nascent BPo sector. For example, at a workshop in 2014, 
Rwandan BPo practitioners pointed out that large market potential could lie 
in the demand for document and process digitisation from local government 
agencies instead of focusing on international inflows of work. However, in 2012 
and 2013, even though the sector was less advanced, Rwandan interviewees 
expressed a firmer belief in the elimination of geographical distance due to 
internet-mediated connectivity.
we speculate that this is due to the fact that few Rwandan firms had yet to 
experience the challenges of finding work on the international stage on a large 
scale; the Kenyan learning curve has simply been much longer. what has 
tended to happen instead is that work has come to Rwandan BPo companies, 
either through a supplier, an intermediary or a multinational based in their 
country. For Rwandan managers, internet connectivity so far felt like the most 
significant barrier to non-local business interactions, whereas in the Kenyan 
sample, managers tended to mention other barriers like social connections 
and limitations in expertise more frequently. It appears that internet connectivity 
is an initial hurdle that prevents managers from seeing other hurdles until it 
has been transcended. one Kenyan BPo manager expressed this sentiment 
particularly starkly: 
Obviously again they can’t access some of these jobs ‘cause if we are 
dealing with the ability to deliver, … at [the] human resource level [they 
are] inefficient, the inadequacy of the same, even when technology is 
available there is a constraint and this is part of what we are trying to 
resolve, […] create an outfit that will be able to address the needs of 
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Commonalities of connectivity-based enterprises
Skills, learning and knowledge as the key link between connectivity-based 
enterprises
the most important link that we found between the value chains and networks 
of the three examined sectors of connectivity-based enterprises were dynamics 
of learning and skill formation. 
Across all sectors, technical skills were important. Naturally, software 
development (and related skills such as website design, graphic design, mobile 
application development, etc.) was a field that was important for all three 
sectors (in particular once the BPo sector had moved beyond call centres). 
Internet connectivity, especially by providing access to open source software 
communities and resources, had a meaningful impact on enhancing the skills 
of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s work forces. Moreover, for all three sectors, we 
discovered a positive feedback loop: the stronger the skill base, the stronger 
the value addition of the connectivity-based sectors, the more value can be 
extracted from internet connectivity itself (e.g., through network effects and a 
greater number of services), the more attractive it would be to obtain skills, the 
more people would attain software development and general ICt skills, etc. In 
other words, the value of internet connectivity and the value of ICt-related skills 
and in particular software development skills mutually enhance each other 
over time.
It was also very clear across all three sectors that actors were not able to 
build connectivity-based enterprises based on the technical skills that they 
received at local universities and schools alone. Instead, hands-on mentoring 
and training beyond technical skills, coupled with exposure to new contexts 
and networking opportunities, usually generated individual success stories. 
International exposure, in particular, enables actors to leverage the ‘best of two 
worlds’, using social connections and applying new skills to local contexts. 
Here, the matching and levels of skill sets was crucially important; BPo 
companies struggled because of a lack of both qualified workers and 
qualified middle managers. similarly, software developers were often 
missing business skills and acumen to develop profitable ICt innovations. 
In other cases, the limited number of qualified software developers could 
not be retained when they were not given good enough conditions, which in 
turn limited the scalability of BPo businesses. In other words, the supply of 
matching labour can be nontrivial even in ostensibly low-skill sectors like 
BPo workers, and a lack of tacit and experiential knowledge can be a key 
barrier that might not be obvious at first sight. 
this also implied that, for all three sectors and in both countries, workers 
and entrepreneurs needed time to learn and advance. Kenya’s ICt innovator 
sector, for instance, benefited from a nascent It and ICt industry that had 
been established long before the arrival of the fibre-optic cables. similarly, the 
country’s BPo sector needed to learn difficult lessons on BPo value chains and 
the (im)possibilities of attracting international work the hard way.
It appeared that changing connectivity certainly enabled the creation of 
businesses that otherwise would not have been possible, but this did not spare 
them from the effort associated with experimenting, learning, and sometimes 
failing, before they could better understand and more easily manoeuvre 
through the complex market dynamics of connectivity-based enterprises. Local 
knowledge spillovers (or transfer) within and between sectors, digitally mediated 
and face-to-face, played an important role in maintaining useful lessons, which 
might explain the recent prevalence of technology innovation hubs. similarly, 
we saw that internet connectivity was often only realised to be an insufficient 
enabler by itself once it had been made available; managers needed to learn 
about other complementary enablers. the manager of a Kenya-based systems 
integrator expressed this idea with the following statement:
I feel it’s more than technology. It’s something beyond technology. 
Technology is just a one step. A hurdle crossed. But the rest is totally up to 
what you do. 
ICTs only bridge distance once social connectivity and trust are in place
It was also clear, across all sectors and both countries, that ICts cannot replace 
or render superfluous the need to establish trusted social relations with 
clients and business partners to enable economic interactions. Existing social 
connections were very commonly a prerequisite for business deals.
this is particularly striking because all of the businesses that we examined, 
and in particular in the BPo sector, were predicated on ICts’ distance-
bridging potential. they engage in value creation and extraction chains 
that serve (end) customers at a distance, without face-to-face interaction. 
However, this is often insufficient for the creation of any larger and more 
sustained economic transactions or relationships. In the BPo sector, the 
crucial necessary step that was often missing was a trusted relationship 
between a Rwandan or Kenyan BPo company and an international client 
that would give them a (large) outsourcing contract. Lacking conceptual 
connection—a collective and a priori trust between East African companies 
and foreigners—was often an important initial burden before any 
company could even be able to prove itself as trustworthy in a one-on-one 
relationship.
It was particularly interesting that businesspeople in the three sectors 
held different views about ICts having a limiting impact on distance and 
intermediation. Many respondents repeated popular clichés and tropes about the 
role of ICts in impacting geography and distance, but when they were pressed 
to reflect more deeply about their experiences in the context of their business 
experience, many qualified their statements with more nuanced statements. 
on a superficial level, respondents appeared to be great believers in the 
distance-bridging potential of ICts. typical responses to the question of 
whether the internet has changed the way they perceive geographical barriers 
included the following two quotes:
Now it is actually improving many things. First of all, the need to travel. 
You can work remotely with those companies in India, they never came 
here. We work together. We have a shared common server and then 
you exchange [files]. That can only happen when you have fast internet 
connectivity. And also, … in terms of training, you can have online training, 
you have sessions on videoconferencing… sometimes on forums, we chat 
and we have conferences. You don’t need to travel.
Definitely, definitely, for example, … Twitter. I connect with people that 
there is no way I would have connected to them otherwise…I mean the 
chances of us having connected…at any other time are so rare.
Representatives of internationally operating companies were also more likely 
to subscribe to beliefs in a decrease of spatial frictions when applied to their 
business environment. they admitted that trust was established via branding, 
the disciplining force of corporate reputational risks and broader contractual 
arrangements between companies. one manager of a large It company with 
offices across East Africa commented that his company did not have trouble 
trusting suppliers “Because [they had been] in the same industry for long years, 
so [they] know by filter[ing] around and work[ing] with some trust”. Another 
commented that trust was not a big issue for him because he only worked with 
large multinationals. 
For these companies, the internet did appear to lower transaction costs 
and support seamless exchanges across distance, in line with Moriset and 
Malecki’s (2007; 2009) findings on global digital production. within established 
networks, where trust had been institutionalised and regulated by certificates 
and proprietary access, people could non-proximately communicate more 
At the same time, examples where individuals turned their skills into 
sustainable economic activity mostly concerned a privileged few who have had 
the opportunity to physically travel to other countries in the past. For example, 
when one interviewee was probed about how he gained consultancy contracts, 
he revealed that it had been through a social connection from abroad whom 
he had physically met. Another ICt innovator described how he lived in a 
“global village” and used the example of online commerce. when asked how 
he managed to pay for goods, he revealed that he had friends in the United 
states who could pay for him. As in BPo, the whole world becomes flat only 
when you have social connections across all of it. these social connections 
are sometimes made online, but most of them are made through face-to-face 
contact at conferences, training programmes, competitions, and through 
international work experience.
there are not many examples that would clearly point to large-scale or 
transformative economic effects of the ICt innovation sector at this point in 
time. For example, businesses in the ICt innovation sector rarely offered mass 
employment. It is therefore difficult to see any obvious trickle-down effect of a 
few entrepreneurs’ success, and so far it remains unclear if the ICt innovation 
sector can ultimately fulfil the hoped-for results of a rising BPo sector. It will be 
important for future research to better understand whether innovation clusters 
around technology hubs can become gateways for fresh talent to enter into 
circles of expertise and opportunity, or whether they create an exclusive elite 
that does nothing to alleviate economic inequalities.
Notwithstanding, Kenya, in particular, has used the ICt innovation sector to 
regain the sense of opportunity around ICt that had briefly been lost after 
the sobering choke on the BPo sector around 2008 and 2009. Now it aims to 
position itself at eye-level with other African ICt start-up hubs, in particular, 
Nigeria and south Africa. In this context, Kenya is starting to build a reputation 
as an exporter of ICt applications to other countries with markets where 
conditions are similar. this includes mobile money applications, but also mobile 
agricultural systems, mobile health systems, etc. In other words, we have seen 
a shift where conceptual connectivity (understood as foreigners collectively and 
universally trusting locals) has been increasing for one sector and decreasing 
for another: International BPo customers continued to generally distrust 
‘Kenyan BPos’, but international actors, especially in impact investment and 
international development circles, started to give ‘Kenyan start-ups’ an upfront 
trust and excitement bonus.
ICT connectivity enhancer sector
dynamic and diverse value chains and networks
As a broad category, more dynamic and diverse value chains and networks are 
present in the connectivity enhancer categories of companies. Both small and 
large companies were constantly changing their products and relationships 
in response to technological change. Figure 6 depicts these value chains in a 
stylised fashion. to introduce a useful distinction, the diagram differentiates 
the value chains of relatively informal, independent and small companies 
(such as the aforementioned payment intermediaries in Rwanda or freelance 
website designers in Kenya) on the right, and the chains of a more formal and 
larger companies, often networked across Africa (such as the aforementioned 
network hardware company), on the left. we will simply call the one category 
‘informal’ and the other ‘formal’ in the following discussion, even though the 
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figure 6: ict connectivity Enhancer chains
International connections for informal companies usually entails them sourcing 
some of their inputs from informal suppliers in other countries. the informal 
connectivity enhancer usually attempts to establish a social relation and trust, 
maintaining contact through communication technologies following short 
visits. Inputs can also be sourced through online channels using credit cards 
or through interacting with open source communities. Informal companies 
sometimes transition to a more formal status by establishing codified 
relationships with niche suppliers. the clients of such companies tend to either 
be either civil society organizations and NGos, or the domestic private sector. 
In both cases, trust and occasional physical visits are used to gain access to 
opportunities and reinforce relationships. 
the formal companies on the left of figure 5 maintain relationships with 
other partners, often within a more formalized regional network. Many of the 
companies in our sample had their headquarters in Nairobi, while keeping 
offices or representatives in other countries. these kinds of companies were 
more likely to maintain ongoing relationships with multinational companies 
(MNCs) and otherwise established companies in other markets. they also use 
these relationships to themselves enter new markets. they have a stronger 
focus on applying for large contracts and government tenders. 
transitions from informal to formal connectivity enhancers or ICt innovators
Interestingly, working as or for an informal connectivity enhancer business 
can lead to transitions towards more formal employment or the take-up of an 
entrepreneurial career as an ICt innovator. Given its longer ICt sector history, 
this has been observed more often in Kenya: some young Kenyans managed 
to create niches for themselves in the early 2000s and have now established 
themselves as competitors to the big It companies with connections to 
India. For example, we saw that by starting with self-taught website design, 
individuals can build up their technical abilities and were able to transition 
into other fields; and it is possible that economic actors in Rwanda might be 
following similar trajectories in the near future.
today it is much harder for young Kenyan entrepreneurs to capture ‘low-
hanging fruit’. on the other hand, with changing internet technology, we see 
customers’ changing needs for new services that enhance the value of internet 
connectivity. Here, Kenyan and Rwandan informal enterprises may have 
advantages over formal ones if they can use their flexibility as well as their 
familiarity and cultural knowledge to better understand, and capture value 
from, the customers. East African governments might also be well-advised 
to think about their tendering requirements, considering how to design them 
in a way that smaller, local, companies have a fair shot at competing for 
government and parastatal contracts. 
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use only specific kinds of gateways to enter new markets or transform their 
value chains. For example, foreign large companies started with large tenders 
when they entered Rwanda or Kenya; small Rwanda- or Kenya-based ones 
often began with one formal contract with a foreign client that helped them 
to establish themselves. ICt innovators would start with website design or 
international and practical exposure and sometimes flourish from there. It 
might therefore be productive for government and large institutional actors 
to open up such gateways and avoid (perhaps unintentionally) acting as a 
gatekeeper with barriers such as overly rigorous tendering requirements that 
exclude small firms and that therefore keep them from growing. 
easily and freely. A Kenyan manager commented how the internet reduced the 
friction of business, describing how:
Time is money. For the business, you know I can’t wait for one item for 10 
days to get a response. If I send you email I don’t get a response, I pick the 
phone, I call. [The Internet] reduces the time frame to move things faster, 
making deals, this and this or whatever. And it’s easier for you to know or 
find a solution. Very simple.
A Rwandan manager similarly pointed to a reduction in spatial frictions:
When we are trying to partner with a company that is abroad, we can 
access to their application servers, they can access to our servers and 
install their applications on our servers with their own expertise. We give 
them access to the grand servers so that they can work on them directly. 
Because of that, faster internet, we don’t need people traveling. 
However, our respondents expressed more moderate views where 
implementation of applications and software in different geographical contexts 
was concerned (at least if an a priori trust framework was not in place). In these 
cases, respondents felt that establishing trusting relations required initial face-
to-face contact. one Rwandan It supplier clearly pointed out that face-to-face 
contact was always necessary initially, and that it would continue to be needed 
when trust remained missing:
[I] get to trust them, especially these commercial companies I deal with in 
the, in U.K. I know that they’re gentlemen. 
Interviewer: How do you know if they’re gentlemen? 
I have been there. And I have seen … their working mechanism, how they 
establish their business and the trust they have.
when asked about his relationships with suppliers in dubai, he commented:
In Dubai I just fly there. I can’t trust them… 
Interviewer: Because of the trust issue?
[There are] very few people who can communicate to you online. At times 
you have to go there or you just have to use the phone? And once you use 
the phone they can’t even give you the quotation. So most of the times you 
have to go there. And even when you want to buy the stuff to fly and go 
there. 
similarly, many respondents in different sectors expressed apprehension about 
going into new markets without a local partner to guide the intervention. one 
Rwandan informal It supplier commented: 
The hardware… for the call centre, I got it from Egypt…But the computer, 
I got it from Uganda. It’s cheaper than going outside (East Africa). So that 
one, I just send them money, I find the representative of that company…So 
there is a trust.
Interviewer: So is all this stuff that you buy all online? You don’t visit. 
Most of them, I buy them online. [When] I do import-export, that’s where I 
have to [physically] go to buy and see exactly the pricing. The problem with 
that will be to have someone locally that can easily go physically in a shop, 
look for the price,…agree how we’ll pay the money, and make the follow 
up for the shipment. For that we’ll need to have at least a partner on site.
our findings support Marazzi’s (2007) argument, that the appropriation of value 
from information (and ICts) requires both technological infrastructures and 
“socio-cultural machineries” and forms of “cognitive capital”. As countries like 
Kenya and Rwanda prepare to engage in flows of international service work, 
they must build up these kinds of infrastructures as well. But it is an inevitable 
challenge that much of this cognitive capital is grounded in social and spatial 
networks in other continents, and only some of it can be effectively mediated by 
digital technologies, usually once initial trust has been created through face-to-
face interaction.
Domestic and regional markets are easier to access and can hold surprising 
potential
skills and knowledge as well as the role of trust directly embedded in 
social connectivities and represented in conceptual connectivity (in terms of 
international clients’ notions of a sector in Kenya or Rwanda) were also the 
underlying reasons for a key finding of this report: namely, companies in all three 
sectors were largely focused on workflows within Africa.20 In Kenya, businesses 
were mainly focused on Uganda, tanzania, south sudan and occasionally west 
African countries like Nigeria. Rwandan-based companies were focused on 
similar countries, but also on the dRC and Burundi. Rwandan-based companies 
were also more likely to be interested in expanding into francophone west African 
countries like senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. there were instances of trade outside 
of Africa, but most managers felt that their own economies and the economies 
of their neighbouring countries were most ripe for profit. they also believed that 
they understood these economies better than foreign (western)21 competitors, 
and were therefore well positioned to expand into them. 
Furthermore, as the domestic market becomes a site for learning and 
experimenting, unexpected potentials can be revealed. An interviewee who had 
worked for two BPo companies before becoming an impact sourcing advisor 
commented:
[W]e would like to get more work from the government…So we have had 
an immense targeting banks and hospitals and the government just to talk 
about how outsourcing can get into that. The Kenyatta national hospital for 
example, I’m told has data that date back to 40 years ago and they stated 
digitizing just a small section of it, I think about 40 million records or some 
big number like that…So when you look at all the faculties in the hospital 
it means that we haven’t even scratched the surface. So there’s a lot to be 
done.
And a manager whose company had struggled to get international clients 
commented:
We tried to talk to manufacturers about outsourcing their distribution and 
stocking and knowing which depots need what and all that sort of thing, 
but they want to hold it in, I think it’s trade secrets they’re worried about. 
Alternatively, the Kenya government could promote outsourcing in the 
domestic market in particular with the government and the companies 
in which it has shares. So Safaricom has 1,500 people and they want to 
hire another 500, Kenya government owns a large part of Safaricom, 
if they were to say, “Safaricom, you need to reserve 300, 400 seats for 
Kenyan outsourcing business”, that would do a world of good to any one 
of the one, two or three guys that participated in that, it could change their 
fortunes overnight.
As ever more of everyday life, economic transactions and state services become 
digital and digitised in Kenya and Rwanda, rapidly growing domestic and 
regional needs appeared to constitute the most significant growth opportunities 
for East African connectivity-based enterprises. over time, the shifts in focus 
towards local markets might actually provide the foundation for businesses 
to become more competent and gather the expertise necessary to compete 
beyond local markets. 
gateways and gatekeeping
Finally, it is important to note the iterative pathways of transitions and upgrades 
of connectivity-based enterprises that were found in our sample. More 
prevalent and promising expansion paths proceeded from local to regional to 
global, and rarely was a ‘born-global’ strategy realistic. Given the role of social 
connectivities, firms faced gatekeeping barriers and were typically able to 
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9. conclusions
In this report, we have outlined how policy, popular discourse and media 
became carried away by the promise of internet connectivity as the fuel for the 
growth of Kenya’s and Rwanda’s BPo sectors. In fact, the development of the 
two sectors has been different than predicted and hoped for. we derive three 
main conclusions:
First, it proved hard to foresee ‘unborn’ ICt sectors. New and unexpected 
value networks and actor groups emerge and develop over time. we saw that 
economic actors conduct myriad adaptations and small experiments, learning 
and adjusting to market realities. Policy-makers and high-level planners can 
set the course for the growth of sectors of connectivity-based enterprises, but 
our study suggests that it is unlikely that the course will be kept with precision. 
second, before the arrival of the submarine cables in 2009, internet connectivity 
was seen as a simple catalyst for economic growth, but this did not turn 
out to be true even to sectors of connectivity-based enterprises. when it 
came to accessing customers and markets, geographical proximity still 
shaped social connectivity (though personal relations) and localised cultural 
understandings, and these factors appeared to be just as important or more 
important as internet connectivity. Broadly, this study has thus confirmed that 
the appropriation of value from information and ICts requires “socio-cultural 
machineries” and forms of “cognitive capital” in addition to technological 
infrastructure (Marazzi, 2007). Kenya and Rwanda ought to continue to build 
these complementary enablers, in particular focusing on improving skills 
and human capital on multiple levels. In other words, internet connectivity 
generates its effects in interactions with other enablers of knowledge 
economies (such as skills and trust), and its maximum value will only unfold if 
and when such enablers are already in place. 
third, strategic opportunities to generate competitive advantages can differ 
markedly between global and local markets also for connectivity-based 
enterprises; trust and conceptual connectivity matter also for them. this 
study has shown that this resulted in the Indian and other south Asian 
BPo destinations, as early movers, having an advantage as they were able 
to build trust and scale efficiencies before Kenya and Rwanda entered the 
global market. As a result, the need to be (socially, conceptually, physically) 
close made it difficult for East African companies to access international 
work opportunities and they depended, to a large extent, on international 
intermediaries and experts. these international networks served to administer 
the flow of commodified work across the world, both through their social 
knowledge of clients and through their cognitive capital in understanding the 
costs and value of information work. In turn, Kenyan and Rwandan connectivity-
based enterprises have recently been able to capitalise on their unique local 
knowledge and social connectivities. thus, the study has shown that, for BPo 
that is based on globally commodified service offerings, competitive advantage 
could not be derived from emulating previous success stories.
ICts and the internet have an intuitive appeal as powerful means to “make the 
world flat” and to enable seamless interaction and economic exchange across 
the globe, and indeed, ICts and the internet are clearly effecting immense 
changes in East Africa’s economies. Yet, our fieldwork has revealed little 
evidence to warrant the proposition that increasing internet connectivity alone 
is allowing economic actors to seamlessly transcend geographical distance. 
our study has shown that the reality is more complicated, even for ICt-based 
sectors that are inherently based on bridging distance, such as BPo. the role 
of internet connectivity for the growth of knowledge economies continues 
to be a complicated one, and much still needs to be done by policy-makers, 
businesses, and workers to adjust to the changes that it brings about.
8. rEcommEndations
our findings have allowed us to derive a set of recommendations for 
government agencies, policymakers, industry associations, and development 
organizations that aim to foster sectors of BPo and connectivity-based 
enterprises. these recommendations apply specifically to the context of Kenya 
and Rwanda but, with contextualization, they could also be informative for other 
low-income countries in East Africa and beyond.
1. Building skills on multiple levels
In ‘knowledge economies’, the human capital and skills of a work force become a 
major asset for businesses. the same is true for connectivity-based enterprises 
in Kenya and Rwanda that are facing a large gap between their skill demand 
and the available supply. technical expertise is beginning to improve, but from 
software development to call centres, lacking management and soft skills (such 
as marketing, time / task management and dependability) are often a strain on 
businesses’ productivity and competitiveness. Higher education institutions are 
called upon to equip graduates with more comprehensive and applicable skill 
sets, including experiential and tacit knowledge. there is also room for public 
private partnerships between universities, training institutions and enterprises 
(potentially subsidised or incentivised by government) to help students, 
freelancers and junior employees improve their job and income opportunities. 
2. Identifying a competitive edge: local and regional target markets can be 
a better fit
Local connectivity-based sectors that target international customers are bound 
to face international competition. when attempting to support a sector that is 
already well established in other countries, policy should carefully weigh what 
competitive advantage the local sector will have over foreign competitors. Labour 
cost advantages might not be sufficient and might not outweigh scale efficiencies 
and learning advantages that foreign competitors have already established. 
Competitiveness might rather be derived from unique knowledge of, and access 
to, local and regional markets. Geographical proximity can underlie the fit 
between the supplied and demanded expertise and also social connectivity. In 
most cases, local knowledge will be most relevant for local customers and not 
for international customers, so that the local market can be the site in which 
local competitive advantages are most easily actualised. International companies 
can face local competitive disadvantage due to lacking knowledge about ways 
of doing business or lacking social ties, or they might not find it worthwhile to 
pursue smaller projects. this fact thus offers local companies advantages even 
in sectors with value chains that are inherently based on internet connectivity 
and scale efficiencies, such as BPo. Government incentives, such as funds and 
subsidies, can be an option to further improve conditions for local businesses, 
but these measures need to be based on a realistic and in-depth assessment 
of competitiveness and social connectivity, which in turn influence current and 
future opportunities for value creation and extraction.
3. Adopting a holistic perspective: Different connectivity-based enterprise 
sectors are intertwined
when establishing a connectivity-based enterprise sector such as BPo, policy 
needs to pay particular attention to other sectors that have related value 
chains and that rely on similar input factors. Beyond internet connectivity, 
skills, reputation, regulation, the availability of mobile and electronic payments, 
access to risk finance and several other factors matter as enablers for 
connectivity-based enterprise sectors. Vicious and virtuous circles within and 
across related value chains have to be considered.
4. Considering social connectivity: Relations matter also for technologically-
mediated exchanges
Internet connectivity potentially allows connectivity-based enterprises such 
as BPo businesses to trade and perform services across the globe. But there 
is an important difference between accessibility and being accessed. Beyond 
legal, economic, and infrastructure factors, connectivity-based enterprises, 
like any other business, rely on the awareness and the trust of their customers, 
suppliers, and partners to be able to make contracts and deals. these social 
factors are usually best established through personal contacts and social 
relations. social relations can be established online, but this is usually the 
exception. For most people and firms in the sector, initial and occasional 
face-to-face contacts are crucial, even if the actual service provision happens 
digitally and remotely. Enabling temporary geographic proximity and venues 
for face-to-face interaction—for example, during events, conferences, and 
business and outreach trips—should therefore remain an important goal for 
governments and industry associations, even in the BPo sector.
5. Building a sector’s reputation: Certification, quality control and 
transparency
Risks from a tarnished reputation are very real for connectivity-based 
enterprises. By definition, connectivity-based enterprises work with customers 
and suppliers that are in a different location and with whom they rarely have 
face-to-face contact. this means that trust is particularly hard to establish and 
sustain. If clients are generally sceptical of a country’s sector, an individual 
enterprise will find it all the more difficult to obtain a chance at proving itself 
as a reliable service provider. Government agencies, policy, and industry 
associations have a role to play in ensuring the good overall reputation of a 
sector. Certification programs that confer seals of approval and that assure 
clients of quality standards could be one important lever. Another way might be 
to set up platforms for accredited connectivity-based enterprises, customers 
and intermediaries, enhancing matchmaking, accountability and the 
enforceability of contracts. 
6. Setting realistic expectations: Collective learning takes time
sectors of connectivity-based enterprises are part of knowledge economies. 
Implementation of technological infrastructures, including ICt and internet 
connectivity, is important, but actors need time to experiment and iterate 
through generations of value chains and networks that work for their context. 
Before any local sector will thrive, competitive advantages need to be identified 
and tested, and risks need to be taken; and all this will be taking place within 
complex socio-economic environments. these are never a straightforward 
process that can be planned and predicted from start to finish. Policymakers 
and institutional actors need to allow for collective learning and knowledge 
spillovers between different actor groups, and between different places and 
social contexts. Multi-stakeholder workshops and training play a particularly 
important role in this context. this helps to speed up the process of iterative 
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